People v. Dasig
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, while on traffic duty in Mandaue City, was attacked and shot by eight (8) persons, identified as members of the sparrow unit of the New People's Army (NPA). Pfc. Manatad died from the gunshot wounds. Pfc. Rene Catamora, who was also on duty, witnessed the incident and identified one of the assailants as Edwin Nuñez. The assailants fled the scene in a commandeered vehicle. Procedural History: Accused Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñez were charged with Murder with Direct Assault. Nuñez initially pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty. However, Nuñez died during the trial, extinguishing his criminal liability. Dasig maintained his plea of not guilty. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City, convicted Dasig of Murder with Direct Assault. The Petition: Appellant Rodrigo Dasig appealed his conviction, arguing that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and inadmissible, and that even if he participated in the killing, the crime committed was simple rebellion, not murder with direct assault. He also contended that his confession was obtained while he was sick and not fully aware of his rights, and that his counsel did not actively assist him.
Issue(s)
Whether the extra-judicial confession of the appellant was admissible in evidence. Whether the crime committed was Murder with Direct Assault or simple Rebellion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession but modified the conviction from Murder with Direct Assault to simple Rebellion. The dispositive portion states: "accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity."
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession: The Supreme Court found no merit in appellant Dasig's contention that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective. The Court noted that Dasig was assisted by Atty. Fortunato Parawan during the interrogation, who confirmed that Dasig agreed to his services and was informed of his constitutional rights. The confession was taken in Cebuano, a language known to Dasig, and was subscribed and sworn to before an Assistant City Fiscal. The Court reiterated the settled jurisprudence that a confession is admissible unless the accused proves it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency, which Dasig failed to substantiate with evidence beyond his self-serving testimony. The presence of counsel, even if not of the accused's own choosing, was deemed sufficient as long as the accused was informed of his rights and agreed to the counsel's assistance, which was the case here. The Court found that the taking of the confession was done with regularity and legality, corroborated by the confession of co-accused Edwin Nuñez. On the classification of the crime: The Supreme Court agreed with both the appellant and the Solicitor General that the crime committed was simple rebellion, not Murder with Direct Assault. The Court explained that rebellion is a vast movement encompassing various acts, and any acts committed in furtherance of rebellion, even if crimes in themselves, are absorbed in the single crime of rebellion. The killing of a police officer, knowing he is a person in authority, was considered a mere component or ingredient of rebellion, done in furtherance of the NPA's subversive ends. Therefore, it could not be the basis for a separate charge of murder with direct assault. The Court cited People v. Mangallan where a similar situation involving an NPA member killing an informer was classified as rebellion. The Indeterminate Sentence Law was also noted as inapplicable to persons convicted of rebellion.
Main Doctrine
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion, though crimes in themselves, are deemed absorbed in the single crime of rebellion. The killing of a police officer, knowing he is a person in authority, is a component or ingredient of rebellion and cannot be a basis for a separate charge.