San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondent Mario Bragancia, a machine operator at San Miguel Corporation, was dismissed from his employment. The company alleged that Bragancia, along with a co-employee, assaulted another co-employee who refused to participate in a boycott of overtime work. Bragancia denied the accusation, asserting he only attempted to pacify the involved parties. Following the denial of his dismissal reconsideration by the CBA-established grievance committee, Bragancia filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. 2. Procedural History: San Miguel Corporation filed a motion to dismiss Bragancia's complaint, arguing that the Labor Arbiter lacked jurisdiction because the dispute, having gone through the grievance machinery, should have been referred to voluntary arbitrators as per the collective bargaining agreement and Article 261 of the Labor Code. Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol granted this motion, referring the case to voluntary arbitration. Bragancia's counsel received this order on October 23, 1990. However, the appeal memorandum was filed on November 5, 1990, which was three days beyond the ten-day reglementary period for appeals. Despite this delay, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) entertained the appeal, ruled in favor of Bragancia, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The NLRC subsequently denied San Miguel Corporation's motion for reconsideration. 3. The Petition: San Miguel Corporation filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify the NLRC's resolutions. The petitioner argued that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by entertaining Bragancia's appeal, as the Labor Arbiter's order had already become final and executory due to the late filing of the appeal. The petitioner emphasized that the ten-day period for appeal under Article 223 of the Labor Code consists of calendar days and is considered jurisdictional, meaning a failure to file within this period deprives the appellate body of jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in resolving the appeal of private respondent when the appealed order had already become final and executory. Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiter's order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and remanding the case to the grievance machinery.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The challenged Resolutions of June 14, 1991 and July 19, 1991 are SET ASIDE and the decision of Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol referring the case to Voluntary Arbitration is REINSTATED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the NLRC's grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the appeal: The Court held that the ten-day period fixed by Article 223 of the Labor Code for appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter contemplates calendar days, not working days. This interpretation is consistent with established jurisprudence, citing cases such as Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. NLRC and Ernesto Dizon, Jr. vs. NLRC, et al.. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the well-settled rule that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to file a timely appeal renders the assailed decision, order, or award final and executory, depriving the appellate body of jurisdiction to alter the judgment. The Court noted that Saturday is considered a business day, and an appeal due on a Saturday is still due on that day, as established in Olacao v. NLRC. In this case, private respondent's counsel received the Labor Arbiter's order on October 23, 1990. The tenth calendar day for filing an appeal was November 2, 1990. However, the Appeal-Memorandum was filed on November 5, 1990, which was three days late. Consequently, the Labor Arbiter's decision had already become final and executory when the NLRC entertained the appeal, constituting grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of reversing the Labor Arbiter's order: The Court found that the NLRC erred in reversing the Labor Arbiter's order. The Labor Arbiter correctly determined that the case involved an unresolved grievance arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies, as contemplated by Article 261 of the Labor Code. Such grievances fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators. By entertaining the appeal of a decision that had already become final and executory due to a lapsed reglementary period, the NLRC effectively overstepped its jurisdictional bounds. The Court reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision, which correctly referred the case to voluntary arbitration as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
Main Doctrine
The ten-day period for appeal under Article 223 of the Labor Code contemplates calendar days, and failure to perfect an appeal within this period is jurisdictional, rendering the decision final and executory.