Bascos v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Rodolfo A. Cipriano, representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE), entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation to haul 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal. CIPTRADE subcontracted with Estrellita Bascos (petitioner) to transport 400 sacks of soya bean meal worth P156,404.00 from Manila to Calamba, Laguna, at a specified rate. Petitioner failed to deliver the cargo, leading Cipriano to pay Jibfair Shipping Agency for the lost goods as per their contract, which held CIPTRADE liable for loss due to theft, hijacking, and non-delivery. Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner, who refused. Cipriano then filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with a writ of preliminary attachment. Procedural History: The trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioner, in her answer, claimed the contract was a lease of her cargo truck, not a contract of carriage. She asserted the truck was hijacked, constituting force majeure, and that she and the police made efforts to recover the cargo. An information for robbery and carnapping was filed against Jose Opriano, et al. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Cipriano, ordering Bascos to pay P156,404.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. The motion to dissolve the attachment was denied as moot. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari, raising issues on the nature of the contract (carriage vs. lease), the applicability of force majeure (hijacking), and the denial of her motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment.
Issue(s)
Whether the contractual relationship between petitioner and private respondent was one of carriage of goods or lease of a cargo truck. Whether the hijacking of the cargo constituted force majeure, thereby exculpating petitioner from liability. Whether the respondent Court erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner's motion to dissolve/lift the writ of preliminary attachment was rendered moot and academic.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding Estrellita M. Bascos liable as a common carrier for the loss of the cargo due to hijacking. The Court dismissed the petition for review on certiorari.
Ratio Decidendi
On the nature of the contract (carriage vs. lease): The Court affirmed the finding that petitioner was a common carrier, citing Article 1732 of the Civil Code which defines a common carrier as any entity engaged in transporting passengers or goods for compensation, offering services to the public. The test applied is whether the undertaking is part of the business held out to the public, irrespective of the volume or frequency of transactions. Petitioner's admission of being in the trucking business and offering trucks for hire was considered a judicial admission, conclusive and requiring no further proof. The Court rejected the argument that offering services to a select group or referring to the contract as a "lease" in affidavits altered its nature, emphasizing that a contract is defined by law, not by the parties' labels. The Court reiterated the principle from De Guzman v. Court of Appeals that Article 1732 makes no distinction based on the principal or ancillary nature of the business, or the regularity or exclusivity of service offered. On hijacking as force majeure: The Court held that hijacking does not constitute force majeure that would absolve a common carrier from liability. Citing De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that hijacking is not among the exceptions enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. Under Article 1735, common carriers are presumed negligent if goods are lost. To overcome this presumption, the carrier must prove extraordinary diligence. For hijacking, the carrier must prove that the robbers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force, as per Article 1745(6). The Court found petitioner's evidence (affidavits of herself, Jesus Bascos, and Juanito Morden) insufficient to establish grave and irresistible force. Petitioner's account was hearsay, Jesus Bascos' affidavit did not detail the hijacking, and Juanito Morden's affidavit was not the best evidence as he was available as a witness. The presumption of negligence against petitioner became conclusive due to her failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence. On the motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment: The Court found no reason to disturb the respondent court's conclusion that the motion to lift/dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment had been rendered moot and academic by the decision on the merits of the case. This ruling is a consequence of the affirmation of the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, which found petitioner liable for the damages sought.
Main Doctrine
A party engaged in the trucking business, offering trucks for hire to transport goods for compensation, is considered a common carrier regardless of whether such activity is a principal business or an ancillary activity, or whether services are offered on a regular or occasional basis, or to the general public or a narrow segment thereof. Hijacking, not being included in the exceptions under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, makes the common carrier presumed negligent, and to be absolved, the carrier must prove that the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.