Intestate Estate of Presbitero v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ricardo Presbitero, Sr. engaged the services of Leonardo Cañoso through two contracts. The first contract, a "Conformity of Agreement," retained Cañoso to negotiate with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for the sale of Presbitero's 270-hectare Hacienda Maria, which was under Operation Land Transfer. Cañoso agreed to complete the processing and submission of documents within 120 days. The second contract, a "Contract of Service," stipulated that Presbitero would compensate Cañoso with 25% of the gross sales for his efforts, services, and expenses in processing and recovering the land transfer payments from the LBP. A subsequent agreement reduced Cañoso's fee to 17 1/2%. Procedural History: After Presbitero's claim with the LBP was approved, he failed to pay Cañoso his agreed-upon share. Consequently, Cañoso filed a complaint against Presbitero before the RTC of Cotabato City. The RTC initially denied Presbitero's motion for postponement due to financial difficulties, proceeding to receive Cañoso's evidence ex-parte. After a subsequent reconsideration, the RTC allowed Presbitero to present his evidence. On April 18, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Cañoso, ordering Presbitero to pay specific amounts in cash and bonds, plus attorney's fees and compensatory damages, and directing the LBP to segregate the awarded amount. Presbitero appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the RTC decision by reducing the principal award to 17 1/2% but otherwise affirmed it. Presbitero's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: This case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by the Intestate Estate of the Late Ricardo Presbitero, Sr., represented by its Administrator, Ricardo Presbitero, Jr. The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision. Specifically, they contend that the trial court improperly allowed the reception of evidence ex-parte without affording Presbitero the right to cross-examine, despite the motion for postponement being based on valid grounds, including the risks and inadvisability of travel during a coup attempt. Furthermore, the petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Cañoso had complied with the terms and conditions of the contract, particularly the 120-day period for submitting all requirements to the DAR and LBP for land transfer.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed error or grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement and allowing the reception of evidence ex-parte. Whether the respondent Court erred in finding that the private respondent complied with the terms and conditions of the contract. Whether the award for compensatory damages was proper. Whether the Land Bank of the Philippines could be ordered to perform an act for or against any of the parties when it was not a party to the case.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications. The award for compensatory damages was deleted, and the directive to the Land Bank of the Philippines to segregate the amount was also deleted. The dispositive portion was modified to reflect the 17 1/2% award, attorney's fees, and the original directive for payment to Cañoso.
Ratio Decidendi
On the denial of the motion for postponement and reception of evidence ex-parte: The Court held that a motion for postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The trial court committed no error or grave abuse of discretion in denying Presbitero's motion. The setting for the hearing resulted from the agreement of the parties after Presbitero had already obtained several prior postponements. The motion was informally made via telegram, violating basic rules on motions. The grounds cited, such as financial incapacity and the alleged risks of travel due to a coup attempt, were not considered meritorious or extraordinary circumstances justifying postponement, especially since one of Presbitero's lawyers resided in the city. The Court noted that Presbitero was later allowed to present his evidence and that any due process deficiency could be cured by a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Court found the motion to be a dilatory tactic. On the compliance with the contract terms: The Court found no error in the appellate and trial courts' conclusion that Cañoso complied with the terms and conditions of the contracts, which was supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Presbitero's letter to LBP authorizing the release of a portion of the proceeds to Cañoso reinforced this finding. The Court of Appeals emphasized that Presbitero's letter, dated long after the 120-day period, indicated that strict compliance was no longer expected and demanded, suggesting a waiver of stipulations or a novation of the agreements. The Court also noted that the reasons given by Presbitero for retracting his authorization were not related to the alleged breached terms and conditions. The Court reiterated that subsequent acts of contracting parties should be considered in judging their intention. Even if there was a breach, it was not substantial enough to warrant rescission, and under Article 1234 of the New Civil Code, substantial performance in good faith allows recovery, less damages. The acceptance of performance without protest also implies full compliance. On the award for compensatory damages: The Court found the award for compensatory damages to be improper, as there was nothing in the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that supported it. The Court did not find any basis for such an award in the records presented. On the directive to the Land Bank of the Philippines: The Court ruled that since the LBP was not a party in the civil case, it could not be ordered to perform an act for or against any of the parties. Such an order would exceed the court's jurisdiction over the LBP in that particular case.
Main Doctrine
A motion for postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should be predicated on the consideration that the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. Unless grave abuse thereof is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with. Furthermore, as a rule, postponements may be granted only upon meritorious grounds.