Nessia v. Fermin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jose V. Nessia, then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias, filed a complaint against respondent Jesus M. Fermin, the Mayor, and the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, for damages and reimbursement of expenses. Nessia alleged that Fermin maliciously refused to act on his vouchers for travel expense allowances because Nessia defied Fermin's request to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections. Procedural History: The trial court found Fermin liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code, ruling that Fermin maliciously refused to act on Nessia's vouchers and was bolstered by his inaction on Nessia's follow-up letters. The trial court found that the vouchers were received by Fermin's secretary, and even if they did not reach Fermin, he should have inquired upon receiving the follow-up letters. Fermin admitted at the trial that he did nothing on the vouchers. The Municipality of Victorias was declared in default. Both Nessia and Fermin appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, dismissing Nessia's complaint for lack of cause of action, holding that the evidence did not establish unjust inaction and that the vouchers were not shown to have been received by Fermin, or if received, could not be approved due to lateness and lack of appropriation. The Petition: Nessia appealed to the Supreme Court, raising issues regarding the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's decision, its granting of affirmative relief to Victorias which did not appeal, and whether Fermin was liable for malicious refusal to act on the vouchers under Article 27 of the Civil Code.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals may reverse the decision of the trial court which had become final and executory as against the Municipality of Victorias for failure to appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals may grant affirmative relief to the Municipality of Victorias which did not appeal the trial court's decision. Whether respondent court erred in exonerating Fermin from malicious refusal to act on petitioner's claims. Whether respondent court erred in exonerating Fermin and Victorias from liabilities, specifically whether Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers, hence, liable under Art. 27, and whether the dismissal of the complaint by respondent court absolved Victorias from liability despite not appealing.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals may reverse the decision of the trial court which had become final and executory as against the Municipality of Victorias for failure to appeal: The Court held that while the Municipality of Victorias did not appeal, the dismissal of the case by the Court of Appeals for lack of cause of action, though erroneous, was a consequence of the appellate court's review of the case. However, the Court clarified that a non-appellant cannot seek affirmative relief. The Court found the appellate court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action to be erroneous. On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals may grant affirmative relief to the Municipality of Victorias which did not appeal the trial court's decision: The Court reiterated the settled rule that a non-appellant cannot obtain affirmative relief from an appellate court. The appellee who has not appealed cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by them, nor can they assign errors designed to have the judgment modified. They can only argue issues to sustain the judgment in their favor. On the issue of whether respondent court erred in exonerating Fermin from malicious refusal to act on petitioner's claims: The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's findings, giving greater weight to its appraisal of conflicting testimonies. The Court found that the trial court's determination that the vouchers were actually received should be followed. The claim that the secretary's signature was not customary did not convincingly show non-receipt. The Court also interpreted Fermin's alleged statement "Basta indi lang ako 'mag-approve sang vouchers mo" as a refusal to approve or disapprove, consistent with inaction. On the issue of whether respondent court erred in exonerating Fermin and Victorias from liabilities, specifically whether Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers, hence, liable under Art. 27, and whether the dismissal of the complaint by respondent court absolved Victorias from liability despite not appealing: The Court disagreed that the allegations of refusal to pay were contradictory to the theory of unjust inaction, as refusal can stem from inaction. While Fermin could not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers exceeding appropriations, he could be liable for damages under Article 27 for malicious inaction. This inaction is also penalized under Section 3(f) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Official inaction prevents the aggrieved party from proceeding in the administrative process and cannot be equated with disapproval. The petitioner's action for collection to establish his claim against Fermin and the Municipality was the correct procedural step, which he satisfactorily proved.
Main Doctrine
Public officials may be held liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for malicious inaction on matters pending before them, even if the claims exceed budgetary appropriations, as official inaction cannot be equated with disapproval and prevents the aggrieved party from proceeding in the administrative process.