Kimberly Clark Philippines v. Voluntary Arbitrator Danilo Lorredo
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Danilo L. Guerrero, an employee of Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc. (KCPI), voluntarily resigned after thirteen years of service. Pursuant to Section 1, Article XX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), Guerrero recommended his nephew for employment as his replacement. KCPI refused this recommendation, citing that Guerrero has legitimate children, and therefore, under the CBA, only his children could be recommended for employment, not his nephew. Procedural History: The dispute between KCPI and the United Kimberly Clark Employees Union-PTGWO over the interpretation of the CBA provision was submitted to Voluntary Arbitrator Danilo Lorredo. After hearing the parties and reviewing their submissions, the Voluntary Arbitrator issued a resolution on October 15, 1991, ordering KCPI to employ Guerrero's nephew. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Arbitrator on November 21, 1991. KCPI then filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Petition: KCPI seeks to set aside the resolutions of the Voluntary Arbitrator, arguing that since Danilo Guerrero has legitimate children, he cannot recommend his nephew for hiring under Section 1, Article XX of the CBA. The Union, representing Guerrero, contends that because Guerrero's children are minors, he is still entitled to recommend his nephew, a collateral relative within the third civil degree, for employment as his replacement.
Issue(s)
Whether the Voluntary Arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the nephew of a retired employee should be employed as his replacement, despite the retired employee having legitimate children; and how Section 1, Article XX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement should be interpreted regarding the employment of an immediate member of the family as a replacement, considering the intent and application of the 'in default thereof' clause.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The resolutions of the Voluntary Arbitrator dated 15 October 1991 and 21 November 1991 are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the interpretation and application of Section 1, Article XX of the CBA and the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision: The Court clarified that the phrase 'in default thereof' in the CBA provision defining 'immediate member of the family' does not imply that an employee must be childless to nominate a collateral relative within the third civil degree. The provision establishes a priority, with legitimate children being primary recommendees, but does not preclude the employee from recommending a collateral relative within the third civil degree, especially when the children are not yet of employable age or capacity to be recommended. The Court reasoned that the intention of the parties was not to create a situation where the ability to nominate a collateral relative is lost and regained based on the existence or demise of a child. The phrase 'in default thereof' simply signifies non-availability or absence, not necessarily absolute non-existence. The Court found that the Voluntary Arbitrator correctly interpreted the CBA provision, focusing on the spirit and intent of the CBA provision, which was to provide for family replacement. The fact that the nephew was hired as a replacement at the instance of the retired employee, and accepted by the company, was deemed controlling. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Voluntary Arbitrator. The arbitrator correctly focused on the spirit and intent of the CBA provision, which was to provide for family replacement. The Court reiterated that a collective bargaining agreement is the law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith. The company is not obligated to unconditionally accept the recommendee, as they must still be qualified and would be hired on a probationary status, providing safeguards for the company.
Main Doctrine
The phrase 'in default thereof' in a Collective Bargaining Agreement provision regarding the employment of an immediate member of the family of an employee upon resignation, retirement, disability, or death, does not have a preclusive effect and does not require the employee to be childless before nominating a collateral relative within the third civil degree. The intention of the parties, as reflected in the contract, prioritizes legitimate children but allows for collateral relatives in their absence, not necessarily in their absolute non-existence.