Villanueva v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Milagros Donio-Teves owned Jumils Octagonal Garden Cockpit, which was located in a prohibited district under Zoning Ordinance No. 62. The Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) ruled that Teves had the right to relocate her cockpit to an allowable site within a reasonable time. The PGC cancelled the mayor's permit of William Fleischer, operator of Bais City Cockers Cockpit, and Teves' certificate of registration, stating that no permit would be issued until Teves completed construction of a new cockpit in an allowable zone. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The PGC later fixed the reasonable time for Teves to relocate at one year from February 8, 1985, after which she was deemed to have waived her right if she failed to comply. Teves failed to relocate her cockpit. William Fleischer, whose permit was previously cancelled, applied for and was granted a mayor's permit for 1986 by Mayor Genar Goñi. Hector C. Villanueva became OIC Mayor of Bais City on May 2, 1986. Fleischer was operating Bais cockpit at that time. The Bais City fiscal advised Villanueva to await the PGC's decision on who should be given a certificate of registration. Villanueva advised Fleischer to desist from holding cockfights until he secured a proper registration certificate. Fleischer's counsel provided Villanueva with a registration certificate issued on August 18, 1986. On January 2, 1987, Teves applied for a mayor's permit to operate Jumils cockpit for 1987, despite not having relocated. Villanueva indorsed the application to the City Fiscal, who initially advised to hold in abeyance the issuance of a permit pending final PGC resolution. However, upon Teves' request and a subsequent opinion from the City Fiscal on January 21, 1987, Villanueva granted Teves a permit to engage in business as a "Cockpit Operator" on the same day, subject to certain provisions of PD 1802. Six days later, Villanueva approved Resolution No. 20 confirming the permit. 2. Procedural History: The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) convicted Hector C. Villanueva of violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleged that Villanueva, as OIC-Mayor, wilfully and unlawfully, through evident bad faith and with manifest partiality, denied Fleischer's application for renewal of his mayor's permit and instead issued it to Milagros Donio-Teves, causing undue injury to Fleischer. 3. The Petition: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Sandiganbayan's decision. The petition: er argues that he did not act with manifest partiality or evident bad faith in issuing the permit to Teves.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner, Hector C. Villanueva, acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in issuing a mayor's permit to Milagros Donio-Teves for the operation of Jumils Octagonal Garden Cockpit. Whether the issuance of the mayor's permit to Teves caused undue injury to William Fleischer or gave Teves unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED, and the petitioner, Hector C. Villanueva, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Costs de oficio.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence: The Court found that the petitioner did not act with manifest partiality or evident bad faith. The petitioner sought the counsel of the City Fiscal before acting on Teves' application. The City Fiscal opined that Teves' application could be granted subject to certain conditions imposed by the PGC and the Court of Appeals. The issuance of the permit to Teves was made on January 21, 1987, which the petitioner argued was within the two-year period for relocation reckoned from the finality of the Court of Appeals decision on January 16, 1985. The Court noted that bad faith implies a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity, a conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of sworn duty through some motive of ill will or self-interest. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage. The Court was persuaded that the petitioner was not actuated by such intent. The petitioner's grant of a mayor's permit to Fleischer was conditioned on Teves' failure to comply with legal requirements, and the subsequent permit to Teves was also subject to conditions. Therefore, it could not be said that he acted with "manifest partiality and evident bad faith" in granting a permit (subject to certain conditions) to Teves. On the issue of undue injury or unwarranted benefits: The Court found that the petitioner's actions did not cause undue injury to Fleischer or give unwarranted benefits to Teves. The Court relied on the findings of the Court of Appeals in a previous case, which indicated that Teves, as the prior owner and operator of the only cockpit in Bais City since 1962, was entitled to continue in operation, with the option to relocate her cockpit to comply with zoning laws. The Court of Appeals had previously held that the denial of Teves' permit in favor of Fleischer in 1981 was equivalent to a denial of Teves' right to continue, as she had the right to relocate. The petitioner's issuance of a permit to Teves on January 21, 1987, was considered by the petitioner to be within the two-year period for relocation from the finality of the Court of Appeals decision on January 16, 1985. Therefore, the issuance of the permit to Teves, who had a prior right, did not constitute an unwarranted benefit or undue injury to Fleischer, who had only started operation in 1981.
Main Doctrine
A public officer may be held liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. However, mere errors in judgment or negligence do not amount to evident bad faith, which requires a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, or conscious doing of a wrong.