Bulaong v. Commission on Elections
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jose M. Bulaong, M.D. and private respondent Luis Villafuerte were candidates for provincial governor of Camarines Sur in the May 11, 1992 local elections. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner. On July 9, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest questioning results from ten municipalities and one city. On August 21, 1992, private respondent filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the venue of ballot revision proceedings to be at the main office of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Intramuros, Manila. Petitioner opposed this, citing no untoward incidents during canvassing in Naga City. Procedural History: The First Division of the COMELEC, in an order dated September 9, 1992, granted private respondent's prayer for revision of ballots to be held in Manila. Petitioner received this order on September 16, 1992. On September 21, 1992, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for One-day Extension" and a day later, his motion for reconsideration dated September 21, 1992. After receiving the COMELEC's order dated October 6, 1992 denying his motion for extension, petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration on October 14, 1992. On October 19, 1992, the COMELEC First Division denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated September 21, 1992. On the same day, petitioner filed an Omnibus motion praying that his two motions for reconsideration be certified to the COMELEC en banc. On October 30, 1992, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a manifestation and motion praying that his motions for reconsideration and omnibus motion be ordered certified to it. On December 3, 1992, the First Division of the COMELEC denied petitioner's manifestation that its motions for reconsideration be certified to the COMELEC en banc, stating the order directing the transfer of ballot boxes to Manila was interlocutory. The Petition: This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order was filed to enjoin the order of the First Division of the COMELEC dated September 9, 1992. A temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court on December 14, 1992. Marito Bernales, a candidate for provincial board member, filed a motion for intervention, which was granted.
Issue(s)
Whether the First Division of the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to refer petitioner's motions for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. Whether a writ of mandamus should be issued directing the First Division of the COMELEC to certify and elevate his motions for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc; and whether the motion for reconsideration was timely filed.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court against the First Division of the COMELEC enjoining the transfer of ballot boxes to Manila is LIFTED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of referral to COMELEC en banc: The Court held that it is not mandatory for a division of the COMELEC to refer all pending motions for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. The order regarding the revision of ballots was deemed interlocutory, as it required further action for the final adjudication of the case. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the First Division in refusing to refer the petitioner's motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. For a motion to be considered en banc, it requires the unanimous vote of the division members, which was absent in this case. Instead, the First Division exercised its power under Section 6 of Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules to order the revision of ballots. The Court emphasized that the designation of the venue for ballot revision is within the discretionary power of the COMELEC Division or En Banc, as indicated by the phrase "whenever in the opinion of the Commission or Division the interest of justice so demands." On the availability of mandamus and timeliness of the motion for reconsideration: The Court reiterated that a mandamus proceeding does not lie against a discretionary power of the COMELEC. Mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, not to compel an act involving discretion. Since the COMELEC Division had the discretionary power to order the revision of ballots and designate the venue, mandamus could not be used to compel them to refer the matter to the en banc. Even if the case were to be considered under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc, the Court noted that only motions for reconsideration filed within the five-day reglementary period prescribed by Section 2 of Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules can be referred to the en banc. The petitioner received the COMELEC's order on September 16, 1992, and should have filed his motion for reconsideration on or before September 21, 1992. The Court observed that the petitioner's "urgent motion for one-day extension" was not immediately granted, and upon the lapse of the five-day period, the order of September 9, 1992, could no longer be questioned, much less referred to the COMELEC en banc. Therefore, the petitioner's subsequent motions were filed out of time.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division does not automatically require referral to the COMELEC en banc, especially if the motion for reconsideration was not filed within the reglementary period or if there is no unanimous vote of the division members to refer it. Mandamus does not lie to compel the exercise of discretionary power.