Aguilar v. Aguilar
MODIFICATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar and respondent Senen B. Aguilar, brothers, co-owned a house and lot purchased on October 28, 1969, for their father. Initially, their shares were agreed to be two-thirds for Virgilio and one-third for Senen. A subsequent written memorandum on February 23, 1970, stipulated equal shares, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation to the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for possession of the house and care for their father. The deed of sale and title were registered in Senen's name as Virgilio was disqualified from obtaining an SSS loan. After their father's death in 1974, Virgilio demanded that Senen vacate the property so it could be sold and the proceeds divided. Senen refused. Procedural History: On January 12, 1979, Virgilio filed an action to compel the sale of the property, seeking a division of the proceeds based on his original two-thirds share and claiming monthly rentals from Senen after their father's death. Senen, in his answer, agreed to the sale for the best price but insisted on an equal division of proceeds and asserted his right as a co-owner to use the property. The pre-trial was scheduled for April 26, 1979. Senen's counsel filed a motion to cancel the pre-trial, citing his need to accompany his wife to a wedding in Dumaguete City. The trial court denied this motion on April 23, 1979, finding the reason insufficient. Senen failed to appear at the pre-trial, and consequently, the trial court declared him in default on April 26, 1979, and allowed Virgilio to present evidence ex parte. Senen's subsequent motions to reconsider the default order and for a new trial were denied. The trial court rendered a default judgment on July 26, 1979, declaring the brothers as co-owners in equal shares, ordering the sale of the property, and directing Senen to vacate and pay rentals. Senen appealed to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the trial court's order of default and the default judgment, finding the explanation for the absence satisfactory and remanding the case for pre-trial. The Petition: Petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) not holding that the motion to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory and (2) remanding the case for pre-trial and trial. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court reinstated the trial court's decision, modifying it to state that Senen B. Aguilar must vacate the premises within ninety (90) days and pay monthly rentals of P1,200.00 with legal interest from the time he received the trial court's decision ordering him to vacate until he leaves the premises. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the postponement of the pre-trial, as attendance at such a mandatory process requires more than participation in a social function. The Court also clarified that while Senen, as a co-owner, has the right to use the property, his continued occupancy prejudiced Virgilio's interest in selling the property, thus justifying the rental payments from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court correctly declared respondent Senen B. Aguilar in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar to present evidence ex parte, and whether the denial of the motion for postponement was an abuse of discretion. Whether the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent Senen B. Aguilar, including the order to vacate the property and the imposition of rentals.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1986, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated July 26, 1979, is REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises within ninety (90) days from receipt of the decision and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00 with legal interest from the time he received the trial court's decision directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves the premises. The trial court is directed to implement the decision conformably with Article 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of default, ex parte evidence presentation, and denial of postponement: The Supreme Court held that the appearance of parties at a pre-trial is mandatory, and a party failing to appear may be declared in default. While the grant or denial of a motion for postponement lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, it must consider the reason for the postponement and the merits of the case. The Court found the reason provided by respondent's counsel—attending a wedding as a principal sponsor—insufficient to justify postponing a mandatory pre-trial, especially when the motion was filed only three days prior. The Court emphasized that attending a social function is not a compelling reason to delay a mandatory legal process. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the postponement. Furthermore, since neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared, the trial court's order declaring respondent in default and allowing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte was deemed proper. On the merits of the default judgment, the order to vacate, and the imposition of rentals: The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings based on the pleadings and the ex parte evidence presented. It established that Virgilio and Senen are co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares, and either co-owner has the right to demand partition at any time. The Court reiterated that when a property is indivisible and co-owners cannot agree on its allotment, it shall be sold and the proceeds distributed according to their respective interests, as provided by Article 498 of the Civil Code. The Court found that Senen's continued occupancy prejudiced Virgilio's interest by hindering the property's sale. Consequently, justice and equity demanded that Senen vacate the property to facilitate the sale. The Court modified the trial court's order regarding rentals, ruling that Senen should pay a monthly rental of P1,200.00, with legal interest, only from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate until he actually vacates the premises. This was because, prior to the termination of co-ownership through judicial action, a co-owner has the right to use the property without paying rent, provided it is in accordance with its purpose and does not injure the interests of other co-owners. However, once the co-ownership is deemed terminated by the filing of the action for partition and the subsequent court order, the co-owner's continued stay prejudices the other co-owner, making him liable for rentals.
Main Doctrine
A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be declared in default. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must consider the reason for the postponement and the merits of the case. A social function, such as attending a wedding as a principal sponsor, is generally insufficient to justify the postponement of a mandatory pre-trial.