People v. De Guzman
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the crime of fencing, defined by Presidential Decree No. 1612 as the act of buying, receiving, possessing, keeping, acquiring, concealing, selling, or disposing of, or in any other manner dealing in any article or object known to be derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. This offense is distinct from the principal crime of robbery or theft itself. 2. Procedural History: Robbery was committed in Quezon City on September 9, 1985, leading to a criminal case against the perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101. Subsequently, an information for violation of PD 1612 (fencing) was filed against spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, as the stolen jewelry was recovered from their possession in Antipolo, Rizal. The respondent judge, presiding over Branch 93, quashed the information, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged fencing occurred outside its territorial limits. A motion for reconsideration was denied. 3. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the respondent judge committed a serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion by quashing the information. The petitioner contends that fencing is a continuing offense, and therefore, the information could be filed in Quezon City, where the original robbery was committed, citing Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The petition seeks the reversal of the lower court's orders and directs the respondent judge to assume jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the crime of fencing is a continuing offense. Whether the RTC of Quezon City has jurisdiction to try the case for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, considering the stolen properties were recovered and the alleged fencing occurred in Antipolo, Rizal.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the questioned orders of the respondent judge are affirmed. The RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, correctly quashed the information for lack of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether fencing is a continuing offense: The Court held that the crime of fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612 is distinct and separate from the crime of robbery or theft. The elements of fencing, which include buying, receiving, possessing, or dealing in stolen property with intent to gain, do not require participation in the original commission of the robbery or theft. Conversely, the consummation of robbery or theft does not depend on an act of fencing. Therefore, fencing cannot be considered a continuing offense in the same manner as defined in jurisprudence, where a single crime consists of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution. On the issue of jurisdiction: The Court reiterated the fundamental rule in criminal prosecutions that the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed, or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place. Since the alleged act of fencing, which involves the possession and dealing of the stolen jewelries, occurred in Antipolo, Rizal, and the properties were recovered there, the RTC of Quezon City, where the robbery was committed, did not have territorial jurisdiction over the fencing case. The Court distinguished fencing from crimes like bigamy, where the prosecution can be initiated in the place of the prior subsisting marriage, emphasizing that the location of the prior offense (robbery or theft) is inconsequential to the venue of the fencing charge. The purpose of PD 1612 was to impose a heavier penalty on those who profit from stolen goods, making them culpable as principals, but this legislative intent does not alter the rules of venue for distinct offenses. Consequently, the respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information, as the proper venue for the fencing case was the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the act of fencing transpired, which was Antipolo, Rizal, and not Quezon City.
Main Doctrine
The crime of fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612 is not a continuing offense, and the venue for its prosecution is the court of the municipality or province where the act of fencing, i.e., the buying, receiving, possessing, or dealing in stolen property, took place, not necessarily where the original robbery or theft was committed.