De Vera v. Aguilar
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns ownership of a parcel of land in Meycauayan, Bulacan. The petitioners, heirs of Marcosa Bernabe, claim co-ownership of the property, asserting that their mother sold it to the respondents, Spouses Mariano and Leona Aguilar, but later repurchased it. The respondents, however, maintain they are the sole owners, having purchased the land from Marcosa Bernabe in 1956 and subsequently obtaining a free patent and title. The petitioners' claim of a resale in 1959 was met with denial by the respondents. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners initiated legal action by filing a falsification case against the respondents, which was recommended for dismissal by the Provincial Fiscal due to lack of a prima facie case. Subsequently, on March 26, 1981, the petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the disputed lot. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering reconveyance and awarding damages and attorney's fees. This decision was based on an admitted xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale from 1959. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the inadmissibility of the xeroxed copy due to the failure to present the original or account for all its copies. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale had not been sufficiently proven, rendering the secondary evidence inadmissible. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision, which reversed the trial court's ruling. Their primary argument hinges on the admissibility of a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. They contend that the existence and due execution of this document were established by witness testimony, and that the loss of the original was proven through the testimonies of representatives from the National Archives and the Provincial Assessor's Office. The core issue before the Supreme Court is whether the petitioners satisfactorily proved the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale and all its duplicate original copies to warrant the admission of secondary evidence.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners satisfactorily proved the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, to warrant the admission of its xeroxed copy as secondary evidence. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, specifically regarding the admissibility of secondary evidence due to insufficient proof of loss or destruction of the original deed.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of secondary evidence (Issue 1): The Court reiterated the rule on secondary evidence, stating that when the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital in an authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability. The correct order of proof is: existence, execution, loss, and contents, though this order may be changed at the court's discretion. The sufficiency of proof for an alleged lost deed lies within the court's discretion. In this case, the RTC merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale but failed to sufficiently inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding its loss or destruction. On the Court of Appeals' decision (Issue 2): The Court found that the petitioners failed to prove the loss or destruction of all original copies of the alleged deed of sale. The notary public testified that the deed had about four or five original copies, but petitioners only accounted for three. Luis de Vera testified that the original was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration, implying it was not lost or destroyed but was in official custody. The testimony of the notary public regarding the burning of his files and the representatives of the National Archives and Assessor's Office did not establish the loss or destruction of the original and all duplicate original copies of the document in question. Therefore, secondary evidence of the alleged deed of sale was inadmissible, justifying the Court of Appeals' reversal of the RTC decision.
Main Doctrine
The admissibility of secondary evidence for a lost or destroyed document requires satisfactory proof of the former existence, due execution, and the loss or destruction of all original copies or counterparts. Merely accounting for some but not all originals is insufficient.