Gesulgon v. National Labor Relations Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Edwin Gesulgon was hired as Chief Cook on board the fishing vessel "Susan II" by private respondent A.A. Mariscor Corporation ("Mariscor"). His compensation included a monthly salary and an incentive pay based on fish catch exceeding his quota. On October 7, 1986, Gesulgon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of incentive bonus, and other claims, alleging that he was dismissed on June 19, 1986, for questioning his incentive pay for April 1986. Mariscor allegedly claimed his dismissal was due to inefficiency, incompetence, and failure to board the vessel on June 9, 1986. Procedural History: Summons and notices of hearing were served by registered mail to clerks in the office of Mariscor's Assistant Manager. Mariscor failed to appear at scheduled hearings, leading the Labor Arbiter to render an ex parte decision on March 11, 1987, declaring Gesulgon's dismissal illegal and ordering reinstatement with full backwages, plus incentive pay and provident fund contributions. A copy of this decision was received by a clerk in Mariscor's Assistant Manager's office on March 27, 1987. After the decision became final, Gesulgon filed a Motion for Execution. Mariscor eventually appeared in subsequent conferences. On February 28, 1989, Mariscor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Writ of Execution, which the NLRC treated as a Petition for Relief from Judgment. Mariscor argued that the Labor Arbiter's decision was void due to improper service of summons and that the dismissal was legal. The NLRC initially dismissed Mariscor's motion on July 28, 1989, finding the Labor Arbiter's decision final. However, on September 29, 1989, the NLRC reversed itself, setting aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and its own prior resolution, and remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter. The Petition: Petitioner Gesulgon filed a Petition for Certiorari, seeking to annul the NLRC's September 29, 1989 Resolution, arguing that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion by treating Mariscor's motion as a petition for relief and by setting aside a final and executory decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in treating Mariscor's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Writ of Execution as a Petition for Relief from Judgment, and whether Mariscor's Motion was filed within the reglementary period. Whether the service of summons upon Mariscor was valid. Whether the dismissal of petitioner Gesulgon was for a valid or authorized cause.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the Petition for Certiorari, set aside the Resolution of the NLRC dated September 29, 1989, and ordered private respondent A.A. Mariscor, Inc. to reinstate petitioner Edwin Gesulgon with backwages, provident fund contributions, and incentive pay as awarded by the Labor Arbiter, plus attorney's fees.
Ratio Decidendi
On the NLRC's treatment of the motion and reglementary periods: The Court held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in treating Mariscor's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Writ of Execution as a Petition for Relief from Judgment. Such treatment improperly extended the reglementary period for filing a petition for relief, which must strictly comply with two periods: within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment and within six (6) months from its entry. Mariscor received the Labor Arbiter's decision on March 27, 1987. The decision became final on April 6, 1987. Mariscor filed its motion on February 28, 1989, which was one year and eleven months after the decision became final, clearly exceeding both the 60-day and 6-month periods. The Court emphasized that the finality of judgments is a fundamental public policy, and the remedy of relief from judgment is an act of grace that must be availed of within strictly fixed and inextendible periods. On the validity of service of summons: The Court found the service of summons upon Mariscor to be valid. Under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, summons may be served on a corporation's president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director. The summons and decision were served by delivery to Ms. Trajeco, a clerk in the office of Mariscor's Assistant Manager Hermosura, who then turned them over to Assistant Manager Hermosura. The Court, citing Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Far East Motor Corporation, held that service on an Assistant General Manager for Operations was valid as falling within the term "manager" or "agent." The rationale is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation as to ensure realization of responsibilities. The Court stated that Mariscor is bound by the service effected upon its Assistant Manager and that it would be contrary to public policy to allow a corporation to escape consequences by pleading the failure of an officer to perform duties. The Court also noted that in regular court litigations, rules on service are liberally construed if actual receipt and knowledge are shown, and a more technical rule would not be applied in quasi-judicial proceedings. On the burden of proof for dismissal: The Court affirmed the Labor Arbiter's finding that Gesulgon's dismissal was without authorized cause. Mariscor failed to present evidence to substantiate its alleged grounds for dismissal (inefficiency, incompetence, failure to board the vessel). The settled rule is that the burden of proving a valid or authorized cause for termination rests on the employer. Mariscor's failure to discharge this burden necessitated the conclusion that Gesulgon's dismissal was illegal. The Court reiterated that Mariscor's own inexcusable negligence prevented it from substantiating its claims.
Main Doctrine
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) gravely abused its discretion in treating a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Writ of Execution as a Petition for Relief from Judgment, thereby extending reglementary periods for filing such a petition contrary to established rules and case law. Furthermore, in termination cases, the burden of proving a valid or authorized cause for dismissal rests on the employer.