Song Fo & Co. v. Veloso
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellee Song Fo & Co. obtained a default judgment against defendants-appellants Maximina Chiong Veloso, et al., for the sum of P2,242.43 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Procedural History: The defendants and their attorney, residents of Cebu, moved for a new trial, alleging they had no notice of the trial date. The trial court denied this motion. The Petition: The defendants appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial, arguing that the default judgment was erroneously entered due to lack of notice.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial based on lack of notice of the trial date. Whether payment of the judgment amount, made under compulsion of an execution, precludes the right to a new trial or appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granted a new trial, and dismissed the case without costs. The Court held that the denial of the motion for a new trial was reversible error.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of lack of notice and the denial of a new trial: The Court held that the defendants were entitled to a new trial because they did not receive notice of the trial date. The rule of practice in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which dispensed with sending notices of trial to attorneys or litigants and considered failure to receive such notices as an excuse for non-appearance, was not properly promulgated as required by Section 6 of Act No. 190. This rule lacked uniform application throughout the jurisdiction and was in direct conflict with the practice in many courts that require actual notice. Since the defendants and their counsel were residents of Cebu and there was no showing that they were aware of this specific Manila rule, they could not be charged with constructive notice. The Court reiterated the elementary rule that parties have a right to be present at the trial of their causes and are entitled to reasonable notice of the time fixed for trial. Proceeding with the trial in the absence of notice to the defendants or their counsel, who were unaware of the rule, constituted reversible error. On the effect of payment of the judgment: The Court ruled that the payment of the judgment amount, made under the compulsion of an execution issued by special order of the trial judge, did not render the case moot or deprive the defendants of their right to a new trial or appeal. Section 443 of Act No. 190 authorizes immediate execution upon final judgment, but this right should not be construed to extinguish the defendant's rights to a new trial and appeal, especially when the amount is recovered under levy or paid to avoid further costs and damages. Therefore, payment made under such circumstances cannot be considered a voluntary settlement that ends the litigation.
Main Doctrine
A default judgment entered without notice to the defendants or their counsel, who were unaware of a local rule dispensing with such notice, constitutes reversible error, and a new trial should be granted, as parties are entitled to reasonable notice of the time fixed for trial.