Ulang v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and possession of a residential lot and two houses located at No. 60 Otero Avenue, Mayabuan, Olongapo City. Brigida Julian initially sold the property to Valentina Salazar on January 17, 1975, with a mortgage to secure the balance of the purchase price. Roberto Ulang, Brigida Julian's son, occupied one of the houses and was permitted to stay until the end of the school term, with an agreement to pay rent thereafter. Ulang later executed a second deed of sale for the same property to the spouses Casimiro and Nieves Ynares, Jr., which came to light when Frank Collins, a tenant, filed a complaint for consignation of rentals. This second sale was declared null and void by the court, which upheld Valentina Salazar's title based on the initial sale. 2. Procedural History: Following the confirmation of Valentina Salazar's ownership, she filed a case for recovery of possession against Roberto Ulang, who refused to vacate and pay rent. The trial court initially declared the second sale void but deemed the first sale an equitable mortgage. The Court of Appeals reversed this, ordering Ulang to vacate, pay rentals, and attorney's fees, a decision that became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued, but Ulang filed motions to reconsider and suspend its implementation. After Valentina Salazar's death and substitution by her heir, Nelia Salazar, the lower court denied Ulang's motions and allowed an alias writ of execution. Ulang's subsequent petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals was dismissed. Ulang then filed a suit for foreclosure of mortgage, seeking an injunction to prevent his eviction, which was also denied. The sheriff subsequently evicted Ulang and placed Nelia Salazar in possession. 3. The Petition: Roberto Ulang filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction before the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the lower court's orders denying his prayer for a preliminary injunction and his motion for reconsideration. He argued that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied due course to this petition, holding that once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution as a matter of right, and that preliminary injunctions cannot be used to stay the execution of a final and executory judgment. The appellate court also reiterated that the deed of sale to Valentina Salazar was absolute. Ulang now appeals this resolution, contending that the ruling on execution admits exceptions and that his right to remain in the property, based on an alleged assignment of Valentina Salazar's loan secured by a mortgage, compelled him to seek injunctive relief to prevent his eviction before the loan was paid. He also argued that the injunction was necessary to maintain the status quo for his foreclosure proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a final and executory judgment entitles the prevailing party to a writ of execution as a matter of right. Whether a preliminary injunction may be issued to stay the execution of a final and executory judgment. Whether petitioner's claim of an assignment of a loan and a right to foreclose a mortgage justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent his eviction, and the implications of the sale to Valentina Salazar.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The Court held that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty of the court. A preliminary injunction cannot be used to stay such execution. The Court found that petitioner's claim of a right to remain in the property and to foreclose a mortgage did not present a clear and unquestioned right that would warrant injunctive relief, especially in light of the final and executory judgment ordering his eviction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the right to a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment: The Court reiterated the established principle that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution. The issuance of this writ is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court. This principle is fundamental in the administration of justice, ensuring that final decisions are respected and implemented without undue delay. The Court cited Torno vs. IAC to support this proposition, emphasizing that there is no room for discretion once a judgment has attained finality. On the use of preliminary injunction to stay execution: The Court unequivocally stated that a preliminary injunction is not a means by which the execution of a final and executory judgment can be stayed. The nature of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending litigation or to prevent irreparable injury, but it cannot be employed to defeat or obstruct a judgment that has already become final and beyond appeal. The Court explained that at the time petitioner sought the injunction, the premises were already subject to execution pursuant to a final judgment, rendering the injunction inapplicable. On petitioner's claim of right to remain and foreclose, maintaining the status quo, and the nature of the sale to Valentina Salazar: The Court found petitioner's contention that he had a right to remain in the property by virtue of an assignment of a loan and a right to foreclose a mortgage to be without merit. The Court emphasized that injunctions, whether preliminary or final, are not designed to protect contingent or future rights, nor to restrain acts where the complainant's title or right is doubtful or disputed. Petitioner's right was not clear and unquestioned, and the ownership of the property had already been settled in previous final and executory judgments. The Court noted that the foreclosure proceeding was still pending and the justification for it had not been determined, further weakening his claim for injunctive relief. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that he sought an injunction to maintain the status quo as the occupant of the premises, finding that his filing of the petition for certiorari was a mere ruse to prevent the enforcement of the final judgment in the recovery of possession case. The eviction had already occurred, and a mandatory injunction will not lie to take property out of the control of the party in possession pursuant to a valid writ of execution. The Court highlighted that the petitioner's actions were an attempt to circumvent a final and executory decision. The Court reiterated the findings from previous rulings that the deed of sale between Valentina Salazar and Brigida Julian was absolute and that the transfer of ownership was not conditioned upon the full payment of the purchase price. This reinforced the validity of Valentina Salazar's title and ownership, which was the basis for the final judgment ordering Roberto Ulang's eviction. The Court's reference to Articles 2088 and 2125 of the Civil Code further underscored that the creditor cannot appropriate the mortgaged property and that the right is to demand the execution and recording of the mortgage document, not to retain possession against a final judgment.
Main Doctrine
A writ of preliminary injunction cannot be used to stay the execution of a final and executory judgment, as the issuance of such a writ is a ministerial duty of the court once the judgment has become final.