Garcia v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case stems from a civil complaint filed by Carmen G. Tan against Benjamin M. Garcia. The complaint sought the rescission of a lease contract, the return of P132,000.00, and P70,000.00 in damages. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court declared petitioner Garcia in default when his counsel failed to appear at the initial hearing on January 22, 1992, due to illness, despite sending his secretary to inform the court. The court allowed an ex-parte presentation of evidence by the respondent, leading to an ex-parte decision on February 4, 1992. Petitioner's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Order of Default on February 12, 1992, attaching a medical certificate. This motion was denied on March 30, 1992. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on April 20, 1992, which was disapproved by the trial court as out of time. The Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari, affirming the trial court's decision that the appeal was filed late. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, arguing that his motion for reconsideration of the default order, filed on February 12, 1992, should be considered as filed on that date, and that his subsequent manifestation on March 10, 1992, adopting the earlier motion as a motion for reconsideration of the decision, extended his appeal period. He contends that his appeal was timely filed within the extended period. The Supreme Court, however, found that the motion filed on February 12, 1992, was for reconsideration of the default order, not the decision, and that the appeal was filed long after the decision had become final and executory.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal was filed on time. Whether the motion filed on February 12, 1992, could be considered a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the merits.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the appeal: The Court held that petitioner received a copy of the trial court's decision on February 26, 1992. Consequently, he had until March 12, 1992, to perfect his appeal. The filing of a manifestation on March 10, 1992, asking that his earlier motion to lift the order of default be treated as a motion for reconsideration of the decision, was made with only two days left before the appeal period expired. Furthermore, upon receiving the order denying his motion for reconsideration on April 7, 1992, petitioner had only until April 9, 1992, to perfect his appeal. The notice of appeal filed on April 20, 1992, was therefore filed out of time, rendering the decision final and executory. On the nature of the motion filed on February 12, 1992: The Supreme Court disagreed with petitioner's theory that the time to appeal had not started to run. It clarified that the motion filed on February 12, 1992, was specifically for the reconsideration of the order declaring him in default, not for the reconsideration of the decision on the merits. Petitioner could not have sought reconsideration of the decision in that motion because he received a copy of the decision only on February 26, 1992. The trial court's liberality in allowing the motion to be treated as a motion for reconsideration of the decision was questioned, as a motion concerning non-appearance at a hearing is fundamentally different from a motion addressing the merits of the case. The motion for reconsideration of the decision was deemed filed only on March 10, 1992, the date of the manifestation, which was the thirteenth day from receipt of the decision.
Main Doctrine
A motion to lift an order of default, which pertains to procedural non-appearance, cannot be treated as a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the merits of the case, as the grounds and nature of the two motions are distinct. The period to appeal is reckoned from the receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the decision.