Calderon-Bargas v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns three separate informations for libel filed against respondents Salvador Lacson, Raul Locsin, and Leticia Locsin. The alleged libelous article, titled "Insurance Monopoly," was published on April 7, 1987. The underlying dispute arose from this publication, leading to the subsequent legal proceedings. Procedural History: An affidavit-complaint was filed by Bennett Ll. Thelmo with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on April 10, 1987. A resolution recommending the filing of libel charges was issued on February 8, 1988, and the corresponding informations were filed in May 1988 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162. Respondent Salvador Lacson filed a motion to quash on October 18, 1988, citing prescription. The trial court initially granted this motion on January 3, 1991, finding the case had prescribed. However, on May 3, 1991, the court reconsidered and reinstated the informations. Subsequently, on August 30, 1991, the respondent court again granted the motion to quash, this time on grounds of prescription and violation of the right to speedy trial, reiterating its earlier ruling. A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on December 16, 1991. The Petition: Petitioners, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Adelina Calderon-Bargas and Bennett Ll. Thelmo, seek to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162, dated August 30, 1991, and December 16, 1991. These orders granted the respondents' motion to quash the libel informations. The petitioners argue that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the informations, particularly on the grounds of prescription and denial of speedy trial. The Supreme Court is asked to review the respondent court's determination that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office did not interrupt the prescriptive period and that the delay in prosecution violated the accused's right to a speedy trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the quashal of the informations on the grounds of prescription. Whether the filing of an affidavit-complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupts the prescriptive period for libel. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the quashal of the informations on the grounds of violation of the right to speedy trial; and whether the delay in the prosecution of the cases violated the constitutional right to speedy trial.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the assailed orders of the respondent court but ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases with prejudice on the ground of the prosecution's failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, which denied the private respondents their right to speedy trial.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court disagreed with the respondent court's ruling that the libel had prescribed. It cited Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. In this case, the affidavit-complaint was filed with the prosecutor's office on April 10, 1987, three days after the alleged libelous article was published on April 7, 1987. Therefore, the running of the prescriptive period was interrupted on April 10, 1987. The Court reiterated its ruling in Francisco v. Court of Appeals that the filing of a complaint in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Thus, the crimes had not prescribed when the informations were filed. On the issue of the interruption of the prescriptive period: The Court found that the filing of the affidavit-complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupts the prescriptive period for libel, as established in Francisco v. Court of Appeals. On the issue of speedy trial and failure to prosecute, and the procedural remedy: The Court found that the prosecution failed to prosecute the cases for an unreasonable length of time, thus violating the right to speedy trial. The prosecution failed to file a comment on the motion to quash, despite being given notice and several extensions, for over two years. This failure constituted a clear defiance of the court's order and an unreasonable delay. The Court noted that in civil cases, failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time can lead to dismissal. Similarly, in criminal cases, a denial of the right to speedy trial entitles the accused to a dismissal, which operates as an acquittal. The Court cited Bermisa v. Court of Appeals and Domingo v. Minister of National Defense to emphasize that unreasonable delay by prosecuting officers can lead to the loss of the government's right to prosecute. The Court agreed with the respondent court that the prosecution's explanation for not filing the comment (i.e., not being furnished a copy) was insufficient, as notice to the fiscal handling the case was sufficient notice to the prosecution. The Court concluded that the cases were properly dismissable due to this failure to prosecute, which amounted to a denial of the right to speedy trial. While the Court agreed that the cases were dismissable on the ground of denial of speedy trial, it noted that a motion to quash is not the strictly proper remedy for such denial, as it is not among the grounds listed in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A motion to dismiss is the appropriate remedy. However, the Court stated that the dismissal of the cases was proper on this score.
Main Doctrine
The dismissal of criminal cases is proper on the ground of the prosecution's failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, which constitutes a denial of the accused's right to speedy trial, even if a motion to quash is not the strictly proper remedy for such denial.