People v. Morato
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On February 8, 1989, Ernesto Morato and Emmanuel Cacatian were charged with murder for allegedly conspiring and confederating to kill Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon with treachery and evident premeditation, using an unlicensed firearm. In a separate Information, Morato was charged with illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866, for possessing a firearm used in the murder. Procedural History: Both accused pleaded not guilty. The case against Emmanuel Cacatian was dismissed after the prosecution rested its case, upon his filing of a demurrer to evidence. The trial proceeded against Ernesto Morato. On June 21, 1990, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Morato guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both murder and illegal possession of firearms, sentencing him to two penalties of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim. The Petition: Accused Morato appealed the RTC decision, raising several errors, including the constitutionality of PD 1866, double jeopardy, the assumption of treachery, the carrying of a firearm, and the failure to appreciate favorable circumstances. The facts presented by the prosecution indicated that at around 9 P.M. on February 7, 1989, Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon was at Franco's Chicken House. At midnight, Morato and Cacatian arrived. An argument ensued between Pat. de Leon and Cacatian. While Walfrido Ponce de Leon, the owner, tried to pacify them, he heard a gunshot and saw Morato holding a gun and shooting Pat. de Leon twice until he fell. Morato then fled. Pat. de Leon was brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. An autopsy revealed three gunshot wounds, with the cause of death being shock secondary to internal hemorrhage.
Issue(s)
Whether Presidential Decree No. 1866 is unconstitutional. Whether the accused was convicted twice for the same offense, constituting double jeopardy. Whether treachery qualified the killing as murder. Whether the accused was carrying a firearm and acted in self-defense. Whether circumstances favorable to the accused, such as voluntary surrender, should have been appreciated.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder and illegal possession of firearms, but modified the sentence for murder by applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. The Court also reduced the moral damages awarded.
Ratio Decidendi
On the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866: The Court found no vagueness in Presidential Decree No. 1866, stating that its provisions clearly define the crime of illegal possession of firearms. The decree is a codification of laws on the subject and does not repeal General Orders No. 6 and 7, which provide clear guidelines on who may possess and carry firearms. The Court held that the law is specific enough to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what acts are prohibited, thus satisfying the due process requirement. Therefore, PD 1866 is constitutional. On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court reiterated the principle that double jeopardy applies only when a person is prosecuted for the same offense. In this case, the accused was charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearms under a special statute (PD 1866). These are distinct offenses, even if they arose from the same act. Therefore, the separate prosecutions did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, citing People vs. Tac-an. On the qualification of treachery: The Court found that treachery qualified the killing as murder. The evidence showed that the attack was sudden and unexpected, and perpetrated from behind. Witness testimonies indicated that the accused-appellant shot the victim twice while the victim's back was turned towards the accused. This mode of attack ensured the execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense the victim might have made. The number and location of the wounds, particularly the fatal chest wounds after the victim was already hit in the arm, indicated an unwavering determination to kill, negating self-defense. On the issue of carrying a firearm and the claim of self-defense: The Court rejected the claim of self-defense. The accused's assertion that he grabbed the gun from Andrew de los Santos was contradicted by de los Santos' testimony and a certification showing he was not carrying a firearm. Furthermore, the number and location of the wounds, especially the two fatal shots to the chest after the victim was already wounded in the arm, indicated intent to kill rather than merely repel aggression. The fact that the accused shot the victim from behind also disproved the claim of unlawful aggression by the victim. On the issue of voluntary surrender: The Court agreed with the accused-appellant that he voluntarily surrendered. The evidence showed that he surrendered to the Provincial Commander the day after the killing. The announcement of a "shoot to kill" order and persuasion by his employer did not negate the fact that he presented himself to the authorities without being arrested. This voluntary surrender was considered a mitigating circumstance in the imposition of the penalty for murder.
Main Doctrine
The crimes of murder and illegal possession of firearms, though arising from the same incident, are distinct offenses and do not constitute double jeopardy. Treachery was established by the sudden and unexpected attack from behind, negating the claim of self-defense. Voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance.