People v. Bellaflor
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondent Reuben Albaño was charged with arson before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28. After pleading not guilty and trial on the merits, the parties rested their case. Judge Willelmo C. Fortun presided over the proceedings. 2. Procedural History: Judge Fortun was subsequently designated as an Assisting Judge for the Regional Trial Court in the National Capital Judicial Region. On March 13, 1991, Judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor was assigned as his replacement. On May 3, 1991, Judge Fortun promulgated a decision dated February 6, 1991, convicting private respondent of arson. At the time of promulgation, Judge Fortun was already presiding as an assisting judge in Mandaue City. Private respondent moved for reconsideration, and on June 26, 1991, respondent judge Bellaflor granted the motion, setting aside Judge Fortun's decision as null and void and acquitting private respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this acquittal was denied. 3. The Petition: The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing that respondent judge Bellaflor acted with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondent. Petitioner contends that Judge Fortun's decision was validly promulgated under Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, as he was merely transferred to a court of equal jurisdiction and did not vacate his office. Private respondent argued that the acquittal had become final and executory, and reconsideration would violate double jeopardy.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the accused, and whether the acquittal of the accused is valid despite being based solely on the alleged nullity of the prior conviction. Whether the defense of double jeopardy is applicable in this case.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The resolution of respondent judge acquitting private respondent Reuben Albaño is SET ASIDE for being null and void, and the decision of Judge Willelmo Fortun convicting accused Albaño is REINSTATED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion and the validity of the acquittal: The Supreme Court held that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The acquittal was based solely on the premise that Judge Fortun's decision was null and void because it was promulgated after he had vacated his office. However, the Court found that Judge Fortun was merely transferred to another court of equal jurisdiction, not that he had vacated his office entirely. Section 9 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court allows a judge who has been transferred to another court of equal jurisdiction to sign and send decisions in cases fully heard by him. Therefore, Judge Fortun retained the authority to promulgate his decision. The acquittal by respondent judge was an "empty judgment" as it was not based on the facts and the law, failing to comply with the constitutional requirement of stating the factual findings and legal justifications. The Court emphasized that even if the promulgation was irregular, it did not automatically warrant an acquittal; the case should have been subjected to new adjudication based on the evidence already presented. On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court ruled that private respondent's reliance on the defense of double jeopardy was misplaced. For double jeopardy to attach, there must have been a conviction or acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information after the accused had pleaded to the charge. In this case, the private respondent himself moved for the reconsideration and dismissal of the criminal case. The Court reiterated the principle that protection against double jeopardy is generally not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused, unless the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence or unreasonable prolongation of proceedings, neither of which was present here. The acquittal was not based on the merits of the case, and the prosecution's appeal from such a dismissal, when the question is purely legal, does not constitute double jeopardy.
Main Doctrine
A resolution acquitting an accused, which is based solely on the alleged nullity of a prior conviction due to promulgation after the judge had vacated his office, without considering the merits of the case, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Such an acquittal is void, and the original conviction should be reinstated, especially when the accused moved for reconsideration of the conviction and the prosecution's appeal does not constitute double jeopardy.