Spouses Pelayo v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Spouses Tiburcio Pelayo and Clenor Comia mortgaged several parcels of land to private respondent Honorina S. Comia to secure a loan of P700,000.00. Upon failure to pay, private respondent filed an action for foreclosure. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City rendered a decision on March 8, 1984, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, declaring a deed of sale void, and ordering petitioners to pay attorney's fees and costs. The Court of Appeals (CA) modified this decision on March 20, 1989, ordering petitioners to pay P700,000.00 within ninety (90) days, and if they failed, the properties would be sold at public auction. This decision became final and executory. A Writ of Execution was issued, and the properties were sold at public auction to private respondent. Petitioners filed a motion to set aside the sale, alleging the RTC failed to issue a specific order directing them to pay within ninety (90) days. The RTC granted this motion and set aside the foreclosure sale, ordering petitioners to pay within ninety (90) days. The CA, however, annulled and set aside the RTC's order, reinstating the foreclosure sale. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari to annul the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court validly issued the January 9, 1992 Order considering that the judgment on the foreclosure of the subject mortgaged properties had already become final and executory. Whether the trial court was required to issue another specific order directing petitioners to pay their mortgage debt within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof, after the Court of Appeals' decision had become final and executory.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent Court of Appeals. The Court found the petition to be part of a dilatory attempt to stall the execution of a final and executory decision.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the trial court's January 9, 1992 Order: The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not validly issue the January 9, 1992 Order because the judgment on the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties had already become final and executory. According to Section 1(a), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, execution shall issue as a matter of right upon a judgment or order that finally disposes of the action or proceeding and upon the expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been perfected. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 20, 1989, had long become final and executory, making it incumbent upon the judge to issue a writ of execution. The Court emphasized that courts should not allow themselves to be parties to maneuvers intended to delay the execution of final decisions, as litigation must end, and the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict through mere subterfuge. On the issue of the requirement for a specific payment order: The Court further clarified that the trial court was not required to issue another order specifically directing petitioners to pay their mortgage debt of P700,000.00, as the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision had already specifically ordered the petitioners to pay the mortgage debt within ninety (90) days from receipt of said decision. The CA's judgment, having become final and executory, could not be modified or revoked, and nothing remained but to execute it. The Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the CA and considered the petition as a dilatory attempt to stall execution.
Main Doctrine
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, it is incumbent upon the judge to issue a writ of execution, and courts must guard against any scheme calculated to defeat or frustrate the ends of justice, fair play, and prompt implementation of final and executory judgments.