Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 106655 · 1994-09-01 · J. VITUG, J.: · Primary: Labor; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Resort Hotel Corporation (RHC) was the owner and operator of Pines Hotel, which was hypothecated to petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Upon RHC's failure to meet its obligations, DBP foreclosed on the mortgage. Subsequently, Hotel Development Corporation (HDC), a subsidiary of DBP, managed and operated the hotel, rehiring the private respondents who were former employees of RHC. On October 23, 1984, the hotel was destroyed by fire. On November 5, 1985, the private respondents filed a complaint against RHC for outstanding money claims, impleading HDC and DBP on the theory that the foreclosed property could be levied to satisfy these claims if RHC lacked sufficient assets, pursuant to Article 110 of the Labor Code. Procedural History: The Labor Arbiter ruled on May 13, 1988, that the foreclosure by DBP placed the workers in a situation akin to bankruptcy, mandating that their claims be paid in full before DBP could assert any claim over RHC's assets. DBP was ordered to pay the complainants' separation pay, leave benefits, and service charge claims totaling P2,181,699.56, plus attorney's fees and legal interest. HDC was absolved of liability. On appeal by DBP, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision on April 15, 1991, dismissing DBP's appeal. No appeal was filed against this decision. Subsequently, private respondents moved for execution. DBP then filed a motion for clarification, seeking to resolve an alleged inconsistency between the NLRC's decision absolving DBP from direct liability and its dispositive portion dismissing DBP's appeal. On July 31, 1992, the NLRC denied this motion, stating there was no inconsistency and reiterating that while RHC was liable, Article 110 of the Labor Code provided a worker's preference over foreclosed properties. The Petition: The Development Bank of the Philippines filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging the NLRC's resolution of July 31, 1992, and its earlier decision of April 15, 1991. The petitioner argues that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by erroneously sustaining the dispositive portion of its decision over its body, which petitioner claims correctly absolved DBP from liability. It also contends that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter erred in concluding that private respondents' claims against RHC enjoy first preference over DBP's mortgage credit and that bankruptcy proceedings are not a prerequisite for payment under the amended Article 110 of the Labor Code. Finally, DBP asserts that the NLRC erred in affirming the conclusion that the workers' lien should be enforced against DBP due to the foreclosure. However, the Supreme Court found that the NLRC's April 15, 1991 decision had become final and executory, rendering it immutable and unalterable, and thus dismissed the petition.

Issue(s)

Whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in its resolution of July 31, 1992, by sustaining the dispositive portion of its April 15, 1991 decision, which allegedly contradicted its body absolving DBP. Whether the National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding that private respondents' claims against RHC enjoy first preference over DBP's mortgage credit. Whether the National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that bankruptcy proceedings are not a condition precedent for workers' claims to be paid, in view of the amendment of Article 110 of the Labor Code by Republic Act No. 6715. Whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that DBP's foreclosed assets should be subject to the workers' lien due to the foreclosure.

Ruling

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the NLRC's dismissal of DBP's appeal, but for reasons different from those relied upon by the NLRC. The Court held that the NLRC's April 15, 1991 decision had become final and executory and could no longer be challenged, rendering DBP's motion for clarification improperly denied.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of NLRC's alleged grave abuse of discretion regarding the inconsistency between its decision's body and dispositive portion: The Court found no inconsistency in the NLRC's questioned decision. The NLRC correctly identified RHC as the liable party for the money claims but dismissed DBP's appeal, albeit based on an incorrect interpretation of Article 110 of the Labor Code. The Court emphasized that the NLRC's April 15, 1991 decision had become final and executory because DBP did not interpose an appeal. Therefore, DBP's subsequent motion for clarification, filed on October 15, 1991, which was essentially a motion for reconsideration, was filed beyond the reglementary period and was thus improperly denied. On the issue of worker preference under Article 110 of the Labor Code and its relation to DBP's mortgage credit: The Court reiterated its pronouncements in Republic vs. Peralta and Development Bank of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission. Article 110 of the Labor Code, even as amended by R.A. No. 6715, must be read in relation to the Civil Code provisions on classification, concurrence, and preference of credits. The worker's preference under Article 110 does not create a lien but is merely a preference of credit. This preference can only be effectively asserted in distribution proceedings, such as insolvency, and must be harmonized with the Civil Code scheme. Furthermore, the amendment by R.A. No. 6715, which eliminated the terms 'declaration' of bankruptcy or 'judicial' liquidation, does not do away with liquidation proceedings entirely, as an orderly distribution of assets requires such proceedings. To give the amended Article 110 retroactive effect would infringe upon the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts, especially since DBP's mortgage credit antedated the amendatory law. On the issue of whether bankruptcy proceedings are a condition precedent for workers' claims: The Court clarified that while the amended Article 110 eliminated the explicit requirement of 'bankruptcy' or 'judicial liquidation,' the underlying principle of orderly distribution of assets among creditors remains. The preference of credit under Article 110 finds effective application in distribution proceedings where all creditors are convened and their claims adjudicated. The Court stressed that the rationale behind this is to ensure an equitable distribution of the insolvent's property and to make the adjudication binding on all parties-in-interest. Thus, while the specific terms 'bankruptcy' or 'judicial liquidation' were removed, the necessity of a proceeding for distribution of assets persists. On the issue of enforcing workers' lien against DBP's foreclosed assets: The Court held that the workers' claims, even with the preference granted by Article 110, do not constitute a lien on the foreclosed property that would automatically attach to DBP's mortgage credit. The preference is a preference of credit, not a lien. Therefore, the claims could not be enforced against DBP's foreclosed assets in the manner asserted by the private respondents, especially considering that DBP's mortgage credit predated the amendatory law and was established through a valid foreclosure proceeding. The Court reiterated that the immutability of a final and executory judgment is a fundamental principle that prevents the reopening of cases, even if there were perceived errors in the original ruling.

Main Doctrine

The right to preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot be effectively asserted prior to its presentation in distribution proceedings, such as insolvency, and must harmonize with the Civil Code scheme on classification and preference of credits. Furthermore, a final and executory judgment, even if erroneous, becomes immutable and unalterable.

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