Enriquez v. Gibbs
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a civil case where the plaintiff, Jose Antonio Gascon Enriquez, sought to appeal a judgment rendered against him by the Court of First Instance in favor of the defendant, A. D. Gibbs. The case reached the Supreme Court on a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the defendant. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance initially rendered judgment for the defendant on December 13, 1912. The plaintiff was granted a new trial on March 17, 1913, to present additional evidence. Following the presentation of this evidence, a final judgment was again rendered in favor of the defendant on April 15, 1913. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on April 22, 1913, which was overruled. The plaintiff received notice of this order on April 26, 1913. On May 22, 1913, the plaintiff excepted to the order overruling the motion for a new trial, announced his intention to appeal, and submitted his bill of exceptions. The defendant objected to the approval of the bill of exceptions, and the lower court approved it. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. 3. The Petition: The defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal is based on the plaintiff's alleged failure to perfect his appeal within the time prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not file his notice of intention to appeal and submit his bill of exceptions within the statutory periods. The plaintiff's excuses for the delay include absence from Manila, limited office hours of the clerk of court, and the time required to prepare the bill of exceptions. The Supreme Court is tasked with determining whether these excuses are sufficient to overcome the procedural defects in perfecting the appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the plaintiff-appellant perfected his appeal within the time prescribed by law. Whether the explanation and excuses offered by the plaintiff-appellant for his failure to perfect his appeal are sufficient to prevent dismissal.
Ruling
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. The plaintiff-appellant lost his right to appeal due to failure to perfect it within the reglementary period.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the plaintiff-appellant perfected his appeal within the time prescribed by law: The Court reiterated that the right of appeal is lost and absolutely cut off unless the aggrieved party gives notice of his intention to appeal as soon as practicable after the receipt of notice of the rendition of judgment. Section 143 of Act No. 190 prescribed that a party desiring to prosecute a bill of exceptions shall inform the court at the time of the rendition of final judgment or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, and within ten days from the entry of the memorandum to that effect, shall submit his bill of exceptions for allowance. In this case, twenty-two days elapsed from the date the plaintiff received notice of the order overruling his motion for a new trial until he filed his exception and announced his intention to appeal, submitting his bill of exceptions. This period exceeded the twenty days which the Court has held to be a sufficient time in ordinary cases for a litigant to decide whether to appeal. The Court found that the plaintiff's notice of intention to appeal came too late. On Whether the explanation and excuses offered by the plaintiff-appellant for his failure to perfect his appeal are sufficient to prevent dismissal: The excuses offered by counsel for the plaintiff were deemed wholly insufficient. These included his absence from Manila for three days, the clerk of court's office being open only in the forenoon, and the bill of exceptions consisting of 44 pages. The Court reasoned that the preparation of the notice of intention to appeal requires only a few minutes. His absence from his office for a few days did not explain his failure to file the notice while he was available. The inconvenience of the clerk's office hours was also deemed unworthy of serious consideration, as the office was open for at least five hours daily, and counsel had copies of all necessary pleadings. The size of the record was irrelevant to the timely filing of the notice of intention to appeal. The Court concluded that the delay was attributable to inexcusable negligence or a change of mind after the appeal period had elapsed, and that it was not impracticable to file the notice sooner.
Main Doctrine
The right of appeal from final judgments, orders, or decrees is lost and absolutely cut off unless the aggrieved party gives notice of his intention to appeal as soon as practicable after the receipt of notice of the rendition of such judgment, order, or decree. Failure to file the notice of intention to appeal within twenty days from notice of rendition of judgment, in the absence of satisfactory proof that it was impracticable to file it sooner, results in the loss of the right to appeal.