Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Edgar Krohn, Jr. filed a petition for annulment of his marriage to Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, citing psychological incapacity. The marriage, solemnized in 1964, produced three children. The couple separated in 1973. Edgar Krohn, Jr. had previously obtained a decree nullifying their church marriage in 1978 from a metropolitan tribunal, based in part on a confidential psychiatric evaluation report of Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn prepared by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr. and Baltazar Reyes. Procedural History: Following the dissolution of their conjugal partnership in 1982, Edgar Krohn, Jr. filed a petition for annulment of their civil marriage in 1990. During the proceedings, he attempted to introduce the confidential psychiatric evaluation report as evidence and testify on its contents. Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn objected, invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. The trial court overruled the objection, admitting the report and allowing the testimony, reasoning that the issue of psychological incapacity was central to the case and that the respondent had not initially objected on grounds of privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, dismissing Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn's petition for certiorari. The case reached the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The Petition: Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn seeks to prevent the disclosure and presentation of the confidential psychiatric evaluation report, arguing that it violates the physician-patient privilege, even when presented by her husband and not the physician. She contends that allowing such testimony would circumvent the intent of the rule protecting patient confidentiality. She also sought the admission of her Statement for the Record, which she claimed was a verification of her Answer. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the privilege applies only to physicians and not to a patient's spouse, and that the petitioner had waived the privilege by previously consenting to the report's use in the annulment of her church marriage and by failing to timely object on the grounds of privilege during the trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in admitting the confidential psychiatric evaluation report and permitting the husband to testify as to its contents despite the physician-patient privileged communication rule. Whether the physician-patient privilege under Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court extends to bar testimony by third persons who possess a physician's report on the patient. Whether petitioner waived the physician-patient privilege by earlier presentation of the psychiatric report to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale. Whether petitioner waived the physician-patient privilege by failing to specifically object in her Answer, and whether counsel's failure to object on hearsay grounds constituted a waiver of the hearsay objection. Whether the trial court erred in striking petitioner's "Statement for the Record" from the records.
Ruling
The petition for review is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 1992-10-30 is AFFIRMED. The trial court did not err in admitting the psychiatric evaluation report and permitting the husband to testify as to its contents; the physician-patient privilege under Section 24(c), Rule 130 applies to physicians and those authorized to practice medicine, not to third parties; and failure to timely object on hearsay grounds results in waiver. The trial court's exclusion of the Statement for the Record was not reversible error.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the trial court erred in admitting the psychiatric report and permitting the husband to testify: The Court reasoned that the statutory privilege in Section 24(c), Rule 130 protects communications "learned in confidence" by certain listed persons, specifically a surgeon or physician authorized to practice medicine, and does not by its terms extend to third persons who are not physicians. Applying Lim v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 91114, 25 September 1992, 214 SCRA 273), the Court reiterated the requisites for invoking the privilege and observed that one requisite is that the person against whom the privilege is claimed be a medical practitioner who acquired the information in a professional capacity. In the present case the person called to testify was the husband, not a physician, and thus the statutory prohibition did not bar his testimony on the contents of a document prepared by physicians. The Court further explained that testimony by a third person cannot substitute for or have the same evidentiary effect as the testimony of the treating physician, and therefore admitting such testimony does not effect the same intrusion into the confidential physician-patient relationship. Finally, the Court emphasized the practical need to allow relevant evidence where the rules permit and to avoid extending privileges beyond their statutory scope. On Whether the physician-patient privilege extends to third persons: The Court analyzed the language of Section 24(c), Rule 130 and the jurisprudence in Lim and concluded that the privilege is personal to the class of persons enumerated by the rule (i.e., medical practitioners), and that it may be successfully invoked only when those requisites are satisfied. The Court observed that extending the privilege to third parties would exceed the statutory text and purpose; the privilege's policy of fostering frank disclosure to physicians explains why physicians themselves are disqualified from testifying about their patients, but that policy does not automatically render all third-party disclosures inadmissible. The Court noted that a spouse who comes into possession of a report may testify about its contents unless another rule, such as hearsay, bars it; however, the hearsay objection must be timely raised. Applying Lim v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed that misreading the scope of the privilege would improperly insulate relevant evidence from the fact-finding process. On Waiver by prior presentation to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale: The Court addressed the husband's argument that petitioner had waived the privilege by presenting the report previously. The Court noted that waiver may be express or implied, and that presenting a report before a different tribunal can be an indication of waiver depending on circumstances. However, the Court did not rest its decision solely on waiver; rather, it found that the statutory privilege did not apply to the husband as a witness. On Waiver by failure to object in the Answer and on Counsel's failure to object on hearsay grounds: The Court held that petitioner's characterization of the report as "either unfounded or irrelevant" in her Answer did not preserve a specific hearsay objection, and that counsel's failure to make a timely hearsay objection at trial constituted waiver of that ground. Thus, even if waiver were in contention, the procedural posture (failure to object on hearsay) independently supported admission. On Exclusion of the Statement for the Record: The Court deemed the allegations in the Statement for the Record to be denials and refutations of the husband's declarations and found them to be procedural or evidentiary matters properly addressed at trial. The Court held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in striking the Statement for the Record because it amounted to an improper attempt to amend pleadings or to substitute for live testimony, and the trial court's ruling fell within its discretion. The Court cautioned that dilatory or frivolous appeals on trivial matters should be avoided in order not to unduly delay the main action.
Main Doctrine
The physician-patient privilege under Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court bars testimony by the treating physician absent patient consent, but does not extend to bar a third person (here, the spouse) from testifying about the contents of a psychiatric evaluation report; additionally, failure to timely object on hearsay grounds constitutes a waiver of that objection.