Spouses Vaca v. Associated Bank
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondent Associated Bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over a property covered by TCT No. 254504, located at No. 18, Lovebird Street, Green Meadows Subdivision I, Quezon City. The property was mortgaged by petitioners Spouses Eduardo Vaca and Ma. Luisita Pilar to Associated Bank. Due to petitioners' failure to pay their mortgage obligation, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the property was sold to Associated Bank as the highest bidder on October 30, 1990. After the one-year redemption period expired, TCT No. 254504 was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. 52593, was issued in the name of Associated Bank. Despite demands, petitioners refused to surrender possession of the property. Procedural History: Petitioners filed an opposition, alleging a pending action (Civil Case No. Q-91-8285) for the annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95, denied Associated Bank's petition for a writ of possession on June 11, 1992, and subsequently denied its motion for reconsideration on August 25, 1992. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals annulled the RTC orders and directed the RTC to issue the writ of possession. The Petition: Petitioners sought review of the Court of Appeals' decision, contending that the action for annulment of the mortgage constituted a prejudicial question and that the rule on the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession is subject to exceptions, which they claim apply to their case.
Issue(s)
Whether the pendency of a separate civil suit for annulment of mortgage constitutes a prejudicial question that bars the issuance of a writ of possession. Whether the rule on the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has expired is subject to exceptions.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, affirming the resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court after the expiration of the redemption period and the consolidation of title in the mortgagee, and that the pendency of a separate suit questioning the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure does not bar such issuance, absent exceptional circumstances.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prejudicial question: The Court reiterated its ruling in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals and Navarra v. Court of Appeals, holding that the pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot serve as a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. On the issue of the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession and exceptions to the rule: The issuance of such a writ, after the one-year period to redeem has expired and title has been consolidated in the mortgagee, is considered a ministerial duty of the trial court. The Court emphasized that the mortgagee, as the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, acquires an absolute right to the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The Court distinguished the present case from Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where deferment of the writ was justified by peculiar circumstances such as properties being sold at unusually low prices or significant delays in filing the petition for possession, which are not present in this case. Therefore, there are no equitable circumstances present herein that would justify making an exception to the general rule that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function of the court. The Court found no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals in ordering the RTC to issue the writ of possession.
Main Doctrine
The pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession, as the issuance of such writ after the expiration of the redemption period is a ministerial duty of the court, absent any exceptional circumstances.