Libanan v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Marcelino C. Libanan, then Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The information alleged that Libanan, along with other provincial officials, conspired to prevent Agustin B. Docena from exercising his rights as a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member by promulgating Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, recognizing Atty. Socrates B. Alar as the replacement for a deceased member, despite the recall of Alar's appointment. Procedural History: The prosecution moved for the suspension pendente lite of the accused public officials. The Sandiganbayan, finding the information valid, issued a resolution on July 26, 1993, suspending Governor Lutgardo Barbo, Vice-Governor Marcelino C. Libanan, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Nonato A. Gerna and Generoso A. Yu for ninety (90) days. The accused officials, including Libanan, filed motions for reconsideration, which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on September 30, 1993. Libanan appealed the orders. The Petition: Petitioner Libanan appealed the suspension order, raising three grounds: (I) the suspension would violate his constitutional right to due process; (II) it would assault the covenant reposed in him by the people of Eastern Samar; and (III) the reasons for the suspension pendente lite no longer existed.
Issue(s)
Whether the suspension pendente lite of petitioner, who is the incumbent Vice-Governor, for acts allegedly committed while he was a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member, violates his constitutional right to due process. Whether the suspension order amounts to an assault on the covenant reposed in petitioner by the people of Eastern Samar. Whether the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension order pendente lite no longer exist.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed in toto.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of due process and the applicability of the suspension to the current office: The Court held that the suspension order does not violate petitioner's constitutional right to due process. Citing Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan and Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated that the term "office" in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 applies to any office the charged officer might currently be holding, not necessarily the specific office under which the offense was committed. Therefore, the suspension of petitioner as Vice-Governor for acts allegedly committed as a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member is permissible under the law. Public office is considered a public agency or trust, not private property, thus the suspension does not constitute a deprivation of property without due process. On the issue of the "covenant" with the people: The Court found no merit in petitioner's contention that the suspension order assaults the covenant with the people of Eastern Samar. The Court clarified that such a "covenant" is not a license that can override the law. The principle established in Oliveros vs. Villaluz was applied, stating that a criminal prosecution under Republic Act No. 3019 is not abated by re-election, and the pendency of such a case provides a legal basis for suspension even in a subsequent term. On the issue of the reasons for suspension no longer existing: The Court deemed it unnecessary to delve into this assigned error, emphasizing that when a statute is clear and explicit, there is little room for extended judicial interpretation. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has consistently held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, without exceptions.
Main Doctrine
The mandatory preventive suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 applies to any incumbent public officer against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information is pending, regardless of whether the offense charged was committed in the office currently held or a previous one, and such suspension does not violate the constitutional right to due process.