Marquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed a civil action against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino, alleging she was his natural child and seeking judicial declaration of filiation, annulment of partition, support, and damages. Bibiana claimed she was born out of wedlock to Gregoria Romano and Eutiquio Marquino, who was single at the time, and that she had continuously enjoyed the status of an acknowledged natural child through direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The petitioners, including Eutiquio's wife and legitimate children, denied these allegations. Procedural History: The case, initiated in 1971, proceeded until Bibiana died in 1979 before completing her evidence presentation. Her heirs were substituted as plaintiffs. The petitioners then moved to dismiss, arguing the action for recognition was personal and intransmissible. The trial court granted the dismissal. The respondents appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). While the appeal was pending, Eutiquio Marquino died in 1983. The IAC reversed the trial court's dismissal, ruling that while the heirs of the deceased natural child could not initiate the action, they could continue an action already filed. The IAC further held that the death of the putative parent did not extinguish the action, allowing substitution by his heirs, citing reasons related to the child's rights and the limited effect of recognition after the parent's death. The Petition: The petitioners seek review of the IAC's decision, arguing it erred in ruling that the heirs of the deceased natural child could continue the action for recognition and that the death of the putative parent did not extinguish the action. They contend that the right of action for recognition is intransmissible, citing Article 285 of the Civil Code and prior jurisprudence. They also argue that the action cannot continue against the heirs of the putative father, as the exceptions provided in Article 285 do not apply to this case. The petitioners assert that the subsequent Family Code, which allows actions to survive the death of parties, cannot be applied retroactively to prejudice their vested rights.
Issue(s)
Whether the death of the natural child during the pendency of her action for recognition extinguishes the said action. Whether the death of the putative parent during the pendency of the action for recognition extinguishes the said action. Whether the provisions of the Family Code on the survival of the action for recognition can be applied retroactively.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the complaint. The Court ruled that the action for recognition is personal and intransmissible, and thus, it is extinguished by the death of the natural child. Furthermore, the action is also extinguished by the death of the putative parent, as the law requires the presumed parent to be given an opportunity to be heard, and the exceptions provided in Article 285 of the Civil Code were not met in this case. The Court also held that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to prejudice the vested rights of the petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the death of the natural child: The Court held that the action for recognition of a natural child is personal and intransmissible in character. Citing Conde vs. Abaya and Heirs of Raymundo C. Banas vs. Heirs of Bibiano Banas, the Court reiterated that the right of action to secure acknowledgment by a natural child cannot be transmitted to his or her heirs. The rationale is that the Civil Code makes no mention of such transmission, not even as an exception, and it would place the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than the heirs of a legitimate child, which is contrary to public policy. Therefore, the death of Bibiana tolled the action. On the issue of the death of the putative parent: The Court ruled that the action for recognition cannot be continued against the heirs of the putative parent. The Court emphasized that the putative parent is in the best position to oppose the claim, and the need to hear their side is an overwhelming consideration due to the unsettling effects on the family. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides only two exceptions when an action can transcend the death of the putative parent: (1) if the parent died during the child's minority, or (2) if a document of recognition is discovered after the parent's death. Neither exception applied here, as Bibiana was already an adult when she filed the case, and no such document was discovered. Thus, the respondent court erred in allowing the continuation of the action against Eutiquio's heirs. On the retroactivity of the Family Code: The Court acknowledged that Article 173 of the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, now provides that the action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both parties. However, the Court held that this provision cannot be given retroactive effect to apply to the present case. This is because doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioners, which were transmitted to them at the time of Eutiquio Marquino's death. A vested right is a right that has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy, and it should be protected against arbitrary state action.
Main Doctrine
An action for compulsory recognition of a natural child is personal and intransmissible; it cannot be continued by the heirs of the natural child after the latter's death, nor can it be continued against the heirs of the putative parent after the latter's death, unless the exceptions provided by law are met. However, the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, now allows the action to survive notwithstanding the death of either or both parties, but this provision cannot be given retroactive effect to prejudice vested rights.