Berces v. Guingona
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Achilles C. Berces, Sr. filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the then Mayor of Tiwi, Albay. The first case (Administrative Case No. 02-92) alleged abuse of authority and oppression for the non-payment of accrued leave benefits amounting to P36,779.02. The second case (Administrative Case No. 05-92) accused the Mayor of dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a municipal water pipeline to service her private residence and medical clinic. Procedural History: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay rendered decisions in both cases on July 1, 1993. In Administrative Case No. 02-92, Mayor Corral was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P36,779.02 with legal interest and was suspended from office for two months for abuse of authority. In Administrative Case No. 05-92, she was ordered suspended for an additional three months and to reimburse the municipality for half of the water and electric bills for her private use. Mayor Corral appealed these decisions to the Office of the President and simultaneously requested a stay of execution. The Office of the President, on July 28, 1993, granted the stay of execution pending appeal, citing that it would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on September 13, 1990. The Petition: Petitioner Achilles C. Berces, Sr. filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President for allegedly being issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner argues that Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) mandates that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory, and that Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, which allows the Office of the President to stay execution, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160. He contends that the Office of the President erred in staying the execution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's suspension orders.
Issue(s)
Whether R.A. No. 7160 repealed Administrative Order No. 18, specifically Section 6 thereof, thereby removing the Office of the President's authority to stay the execution of decisions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending appeal. Whether the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the stay of execution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's decisions.
Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit and is hereby DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether R.A. No. 7160 repealed Administrative Order No. 18: The Court held that R.A. No. 7160 did not expressly repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 7160 did not specifically identify or designate Administrative Order No. 18 for repeal. Any repeal, if existing, would be by implication, which is not favored by law. For an implied repeal to exist, there must be an irreconcilable conflict and repugnancy between the provisions of the new and prior laws. The Court found that Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably inconsistent and can be read together. The provision in R.A. No. 7160 stating that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory" does not deprive reviewing officials of the discretion to stay execution. If Congress intended to repeal the authority to stay execution, it could have used more direct language. The term "shall" can be interpreted as directory, depending on the context and object of the law. The authority to stay execution pending appeal is procedural, and in the absence of clear legislative intent to remove it, such authority can be provided in rules and regulations governing appeals. On the issue of whether the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion. The Office of the President, in exercising its discretion under Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, made a finding that the execution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's decision suspending the Mayor might be prejudicial to public interest. To prevent disruption in the rendition of public service by the Mayor, a stay of execution was deemed just and reasonable. This action was within the bounds of the President's authority to direct or stay execution upon such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable, as provided by law and administrative issuances.
Main Doctrine
The Office of the President may stay the execution of a decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending appeal, even if R.A. No. 7160 provides that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory, as this authority is not irreconcilably inconsistent with the said law and can be read in conjunction with it, especially when such stay is deemed just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.