Nasser v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115829 · 1995-06-05 · J. BELLOSILLO, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The case originated from a dispute between brothers Calvin R. Borre and Arnaldo R. Borre over a parcel of land with a spring, intended for a water supply business. Calvin initially purchased the land, but it was subsequently sold to Arnaldo, prompting Calvin to file a civil action to nullify the sale. Procedural History: During the litigation, the brothers entered into a court-approved compromise agreement where Arnaldo retained title but Calvin would receive 40% of the net income of the Lidao Water System. A commissioner was appointed for auditing due to accounting difficulties. Calvin discovered Arnaldo allegedly established separate entities, Samal Water Services, Inc., and Island Spring Ship Water Supplier, to divert income. The trial court ordered Arnaldo and other water drawers, including petitioner Mariano Nasser, to deposit funds and submit records. Nasser failed to comply, leading to garnishment of his receivables. Arnaldo and Nasser filed numerous petitions and motions, including petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and appeals before the Court of Appeals, all of which were dismissed. A supplementary compromise agreement was later entered into by Calvin, Arnaldo, and Nasser, wherein Nasser agreed to pay for his water withdrawals at a specified rate and deposit payments. Despite this agreement's approval, Arnaldo continued to contest its execution. Subsequently, the heirs of Calvin Borre filed a civil suit for damages and contempt against Nasser for non-compliance with the supplementary agreement, leading the trial court to order a writ of execution against Nasser. The Petition: Petitioner Mariano Nasser appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution by mere motion after ten years had passed since the finality of the judgment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the writ of execution had been questioned before the Supreme Court and that Nasser's dilatory actions prevented execution. The appellate court also found Nasser liable based on his signature on the supplementary compromise agreement and his bad faith in conspiring with Arnaldo.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner Nasser's appeal regarding the issuance of a writ of execution after the lapse of the prescriptive period, considering potential dilatory tactics. Whether petitioner Nasser is bound by the supplementary compromise agreement despite not being an original party to the civil case. Whether petitioner Nasser's actions constituted conspiracy and bad faith.

Ruling

The petition is DISMISSED. An alias writ of execution of the Order dated 24 February 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, Br. 4, is ordered to be issued and enforced without further delay. This decision is immediately executory. Treble costs are imposed against the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of the prescriptive period for execution and dilatory tactics: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the five-year prescriptive period for execution by mere motion does not apply in this case. The Court found that petitioner Nasser, along with Arnaldo Borre, employed a series of dilatory actions, including filing multiple motions for reconsideration and petitions before appellate courts, specifically to delay the execution of the judgment based on the compromise agreement. The Court emphasized that public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of their victory through subterfuge. The prolonged delay, attributed to Nasser's actions, effectively tolled the prescriptive period. The Court reiterated that litigation must eventually terminate, and the enforcement of a final judgment, especially one based on a compromise, should not be indefinitely postponed. On the issue of petitioner Nasser's liability under the supplementary compromise agreement: The Supreme Court held that petitioner Nasser is bound by the supplementary compromise agreement. By signing the agreement, Nasser submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and agreed to its terms, which included paying for his water withdrawals. The Court found that this agreement superseded the previous one between the Borre brothers and had the effect of res judicata among all signatories, including Nasser. His participation was not merely to facilitate a settlement but to commit to specific obligations regarding his water usage and payments. The Court noted that Nasser was given an opportunity to dispute allegations of conspiracy but failed to do so, leading the trial court to conclude that he conspired with Arnaldo to deprive Calvin of his rightful share. On the issue of conspiracy and bad faith: The Court affirmed the finding of bad faith and conspiracy on the part of petitioner Nasser and Arnaldo Borre. The evidence presented, including Nasser's failure to comply with court orders to produce proof of payment and his participation in the supplementary compromise agreement, supported the conclusion that he acted in concert with Arnaldo to deprive Calvin Borre of his rightful share in the water business. The Court viewed Nasser's actions as an attempt to act as an alter ego or a marketing arm for Arnaldo's business, aimed at evading the terms of the compromise agreement. This conspiracy, coupled with the dilatory tactics, demonstrated Nasser's evident bad faith.

Main Doctrine

A supplementary compromise agreement, once approved by the court, has the effect of res judicata and binds all signatories, including those who were not originally parties to the original case but participated in the supplementary agreement, thereby submitting themselves to the court's jurisdiction. Dilatory tactics employed to delay the execution of a final and executory judgment, especially one based on a compromise agreement, will not be countenanced and will not toll the prescriptive period for execution.

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