Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon, filed a complaint against Parañaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez for Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The charge stemmed from Olivarez's alleged unreasonable refusal to issue a mayor's permit for BCCI's night manufacturer's fair, despite Parañaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 744, Series of 1992, which Olivarez himself approved. BCCI alleged that Olivarez demanded money for the permit. Olivarez, in his counter-affidavit, denied the charge, stating BCCI never applied for a mayor's permit and that the letters requesting assistance were not filed with the proper office. He also issued an executive order granting a similar permit to another group of Baclaran-based vendors. Procedural History: A Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III recommended prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(f) of RA 3019. However, Special Prosecutor (SP) II recommended filing an information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, which was approved by higher officials and the Ombudsman. An Information was filed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation, which was granted. Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) I recommended withdrawal of the information, but this was disapproved by SP Desierto and Ombudsman Vasquez, who found bad faith evident. Petitioner surrendered and posted bail. The Sandiganbayan denied his Omnibus Motion and ordered his arraignment, entering a plea of "not guilty" when he refused to plead. Petitioner filed several motions, including a motion to set aside the plea and dismiss the case. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion but set aside the proceedings and arraignment to avoid delay, deferring action on the motion to suspend petitioner pendente lite. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was granted, remanding the case to the Ombudsman for another reinvestigation. During this reinvestigation, SPO III recommended withdrawal of the Information, citing that granting an exclusive permit to BCCI would be an unwarranted benefit and that BCCI failed to comply with requirements. However, complainant Manuel A. Vizcarra requested the disqualification of SPO III Berbano. The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo, who recommended dismissal, finding no liability for violation of Sec. 3(f) or 3(e) of RA 3019. DSP de G. Ferrer reversed this recommendation, stating Olivarez was liable under Sec. 3(e) for giving unwarranted benefit through manifest partiality. This reversal was concurred by SP Desierto and approved by Ombudsman Vasquez, who directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing information. Petitioner filed further motions, including a motion to strike out the Ombudsman's resolution and dismiss the information, which the Sandiganbayan denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed an original action for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the Ombudsman's power to review and disapprove recommendations of prosecutors through marginal notes without a new preliminary investigation, and the Sandiganbayan's alleged grave abuse of discretion in refusing to review the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. Petitioner also questioned the change in theory from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality."
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing and disapproving the recommendations of investigating prosecutors through marginal notes without conducting a new preliminary investigation. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to review the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. Whether the alleged shift in theory from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality" constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Whether there exists probable cause to hold petitioner liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Ombudsman's power to review and disapprove recommendations: The Court held that the Ombudsman's power to review and approve or disapprove recommendations of investigating prosecutors, even through marginal notes, is a valid exercise of his constitutional mandate. The mere fact that the order to file an information was contained in a marginal note does not, by itself, impute arbitrariness, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that this power is based on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted to the Office of the Ombudsman and for practicality, to avoid swamping the courts with petitions assailing every dismissal of an investigatory proceeding. The Court cited Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al., stating that the Ombudsman is not conducting a new investigation but merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation, and it is discretionary upon him if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor. The Ombudsman can make his own findings of fact, and there is nothing preventing him from arriving at a conclusion different from that of the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. On the Sandiganbayan's refusal to review the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. The petition primarily raised questions of fact regarding the Ombudsman's appreciation of the evidence, which the Supreme Court, as a rule, does not entertain in a certiorari proceeding. The Court reiterated that it is not a trier of facts, especially in applications for certiorari, which are limited to questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The circumstances of the recourse were also suggestive of dilatory purposes. On the alleged shift in theory: The Court stated that the alleged shift in theory from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality" does not present a sufficient indicium of grave abuse of discretion. Manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence are elements of the offense defined under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The presence or absence of these elements are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense to be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Therefore, the issue of whether there was bad faith or manifest partiality should be determined during the trial proper, not in the preliminary investigation. On the existence of probable cause: The Court found sufficient evidence to warrant the filing of charges for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Court noted inconsistencies in petitioner's defense regarding the exclusivity of BCCI's authority to operate and the justification for issuing an executive order to another group. The Court found that petitioner could not plausibly demonstrate how issuing a permit to BCCI would adversely affect public interest, especially since the Sangguniang Bayan had approved BCCI's fair. The issuance of a permit to another group via an executive order, while imposing many requirements on BCCI, suggested possible haste and unequal treatment. The Court also pointed out that petitioner, as mayor, had the authority to act on BCCI's letter-application, even if not strictly in accordance with normal procedure, and his indifference tainted his actuations with dubiety. The Court concluded that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman were supported by substantial evidence and were conclusive, and that there was enough evidence to warrant the filing of a formal charge.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that the Ombudsman's power to review recommendations of investigating prosecutors and to approve or disapprove them, even through marginal notes, is a valid exercise of constitutional mandate, and such actions do not constitute grave abuse of discretion absent clear evidence thereof. The Court also reiterated that a preliminary investigation is not a trial on the merits but merely an inquiry to determine probable cause, and the determination of whether elements like manifest partiality or evident bad faith exist are evidentiary matters best resolved during trial.