Relampagos v. Cumba
ABANDONMENTFacts
1. The Antecedents: In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, Emmanuel M. Relampagos and Rosita C. Cumba were candidates for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Cumba was initially proclaimed the winner by a margin of twenty-two votes. Relampagos filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte. 2. Procedural History: The RTC, on June 29, 1994, declared Relampagos the winner by six votes and issued a decision in his favor. Copies were received by both parties on July 1, 1994. Cumba appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on July 4, 1994, and the RTC gave due course to the appeal on July 8, 1994. Relampagos filed a motion for execution pending appeal on July 12, 1994, which the RTC granted on August 3, 1994, issuing a writ of execution. Cumba then filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC to annul the RTC's order and writ of execution, arguing the RTC had lost jurisdiction after the appeal was perfected. On February 9, 1995, the COMELEC granted Cumba's petition, declaring its exclusive authority to hear such petitions and nullifying the RTC's order and writ. 3. The Petition: Relampagos filed this special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging the COMELEC's resolution. He contends that the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs, citing prior Supreme Court rulings in Garcia v. De Jesus and Veloria v. Commission on Elections. The COMELEC, however, asserts its jurisdiction based on Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which it claims was not repealed and grants it exclusive authority to hear certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus petitions in election cases, particularly in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in this decision, re-examines its prior rulings and holds that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in effect, granting the COMELEC the authority to issue these writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and affirms the COMELEC's resolution.
Issue(s)
Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases; and whether Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which purportedly grants the COMELEC such jurisdiction, remains in full force and effect despite the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal after the perfection of the appeal.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the challenged resolution of the Commission on Elections is affirmed. The COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal after the perfection of the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue extraordinary writs and the validity of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697: The Court abandons its previous rulings in Garcia v. De Jesus, Uy v. Commission on Elections, and Veloria v. Commission on Elections, which held that the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus due to the absence of specific constitutional or statutory conferment. The Court now holds that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which vests the COMELEC with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases, remains in full force and effect. This provision is not inconsistent with the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and was intended to fill a void in the law, providing the COMELEC with jurisdiction in aid of its appellate powers. The Court emphasizes that implied repeals are not favored and that statutes must be reconciled unless there is clear inconsistency. The Court finds that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 was not repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). While B.P. Blg. 697 was enacted to govern the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections, its provision granting the COMELEC authority over extraordinary writs in election cases is not restricted to a specific period. The repealing clause of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly repeals PD 1296 and other inconsistent laws, but it does not expressly repeal B.P. Blg. 697. The Court's painstaking examination revealed no inconsistency between Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 and the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Therefore, the presumption against implied repeals applies, and the specific grant of authority in B.P. Blg. 697 remains effective. On the RTC's grave abuse of discretion: The Court affirms the COMELEC's finding that the RTC committed palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal and issuing the writ of execution. An appeal is perfected on the last day for any party to appeal, which was July 6, 1994. The private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee on July 4, 1994, and the RTC gave due course to the appeal on July 8, 1994, ordering the elevation of the records. Consequently, the RTC was divested of its jurisdiction over the case. The motion for execution pending appeal was filed on July 12, 1994, which was after the perfection of the appeal. Therefore, the RTC could no longer validly act on the motion, as it had lost jurisdiction over the case.
Main Doctrine
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, as provided in the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force and effect. The Court abandons its previous rulings in Garcia v. De Jesus, Uy v. Commission on Elections, and Veloria v. Commission on Elections.