Manila Electric Company v. La Campana Food Products, Inc.
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondent La Campana Food Products, Inc. (La Campana) filed a complaint against petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) for recovery of a sum of money with preliminary injunction. The dispute arose from Meralco's notice of disconnection due to alleged non-payment of a differential billing for P65,619.26, stemming from meter tampering discovered on September 22, 1986, and an underbilling of P169,941.29 (with a balance of P28,323.55) from January 16, 1987, to December 16, 1987, due to meter multiplier failure. 2. Procedural History: The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6480, was initially assigned to Branch 78 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then re-raffled to Branch 80, presided over by Judge Benigno T. Dayaw, after the initial judge inhibited himself. Meralco filed a motion for extension to file an answer, which was not acted upon due to a defective notice of hearing. Meralco's answer was filed beyond the reglementary period. Consequently, La Campana filed a motion to declare Meralco in default, which was granted by Judge Dayaw on October 8, 1990. After an ex parte hearing, the court rendered a decision on November 20, 1990, ordering Meralco to reconnect service, return P141,617.74 with interest, and pay attorney's fees and costs. Meralco filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default and/or for new trial, which was denied by Judge Dayaw on January 10, 1991. Meralco's subsequent notice of appeal filed on January 28, 1991, was also denied as out of time, and the court granted La Campana's motion for execution. 3. The Petition: Meralco filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging grave abuse of discretion by Judge Dayaw in rendering the decision and subsequent orders. Meralco argued that its answer was filed within the requested extension period and that the default judgment was obtained by fraud. The Supreme Court, however, found no abuse of discretion, emphasizing Meralco's failure to comply with procedural rules regarding motions for extension and its failure to establish fraud. The Court also clarified that Meralco's motion to set aside the judgment by default was a pro forma motion, thus not interrupting the period to appeal, and that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision by default. Whether Meralco's motion for extension of time to file an answer was valid. Whether Meralco's motion to set aside the judgment by default and/or for new trial was proper and timely filed. Whether Meralco's notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. The decision dated November 20, 1990, and the subsequent orders are declared final, and the writ of execution is declared valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision by default: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion. Meralco failed to file its answer within the reglementary period, which expired on September 7, 1990. Its subsequent filing on September 21, 1990, was beyond this period. The court a quo correctly declared Meralco in default after La Campana filed an ex parte motion for default. The judgment by default was based on the evidence presented by La Campana, which is permissible when a defendant is in default. The Court reiterated that a defendant in default is no longer entitled to notice of the motion to declare them in default. On the validity of the motion for extension of time to file an answer: The Court held that Meralco's motion for extension of time was defective because it did not contain a notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Citing Gozon, et al. v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that such a motion is considered a "worthless piece of paper" which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon. Therefore, the filing of the answer on September 21, 1990, was indeed beyond the reglementary period, and the motion for extension, being invalid, did not toll the period to answer. On the propriety and timeliness of the motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial: The Court found the motion to be pro forma and correctly denied. As a motion to set aside the order of default, it failed to show that Meralco's failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect, as required by Rule 18, Section 3. The claim of fraud was not substantiated with particularity. As a motion for new trial grounded on fraud, it failed to establish extrinsic fraud that prevented Meralco from presenting its case. The alleged fraud, that La Campana knew Meralco had filed its answer when it filed the motion to declare default, was disproven by the dates of filing and receipt. Moreover, a pro forma motion does not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. On whether the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period: The Court ruled that the notice of appeal was filed out of time. Since the motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial was pro forma, it did not interrupt the period to appeal. Meralco received the decision on November 29, 1990, and had fifteen days, or until December 14, 1990, to file its appeal. The notice of appeal filed on January 28, 1991, was therefore filed beyond the reglementary period. Consequently, Meralco lost its right to appeal.
Main Doctrine
A motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper and cannot be acted upon by the court. A motion for extension of time to file an answer, if defective for lack of notice of hearing, does not toll the reglementary period to file an answer. Furthermore, a motion to set aside a judgment by default, if pro forma, does not interrupt the period to appeal. Certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.