Djumantan v. Domingo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Bernard Banez, a Filipino contract worker in Indonesia, converted to Islam and married petitioner, Djumantan, in accordance with Islamic rites. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner and her two children arrived as "guests" of Banez, who facilitated their entry as temporary visitors by executing an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support" and concealing his marriage to Djumantan. Petitioner and her children were admitted as temporary visitors. Later, Banez's legal wife discovered the relationship, leading to a dismissed concubinage complaint. Petitioner's status was subsequently changed to permanent resident. A complaint was filed with the Ombudsman, leading to petitioner's detention and subsequent release on bail pending deportation proceedings. Petitioner initially sought voluntary departure but later moved to dismiss the deportation case, claiming a valid marriage to a Filipino citizen. Procedural History: The Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) issued a Decision dated September 27, 1990, ordering the deportation of petitioner and revoking her Section 13(a) visa, finding her marriage to Banez irregular and not in accordance with Philippine laws. A Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denied her motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to reverse and set aside the CID's decision and resolution.
Issue(s)
Whether the CID has the right to order the deportation of the petitioner. Whether the deportation proceedings against the petitioner have prescribed. Whether the petitioner's admission into the country and acquisition of permanent residency were lawful. Whether the revocation of petitioner's permanent resident visa constitutes an order of deportation.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990, revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991, are REVERSED. The temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991, is MADE PERMANENT.
Ratio Decidendi
On the nature of the CID's action: The Court rejected the public respondents' argument that revoking the visa was not an order of deportation. The Court held that when the CID revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien. This action was a direct consequence of the findings regarding the irregularity of her admission and status change. On the prescriptive period for deportation: The Court addressed the Solicitor General's argument that the right to deport had prescribed under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940. While Section 37(b) provides a five-year limitation for deportation under certain clauses, it explicitly states that deportation may be effected "at any time after entry" under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 of Section 37(a). The Court noted that the petitioner's entry was based on false and misleading statements, which falls under Section 37(a)(1), a clause not subject to the five-year prescriptive period as interpreted by some dissenting opinions in prior cases. However, the Court found that the initial complaint was filed on November 19, 1980, and the deportation order was issued on September 27, 1990. Tolling the prescriptive period from the date of the complaint, more than five years had elapsed before the deportation order was issued. The Court clarified that the "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for carrying out a deportation order, and revoking the permanent residence visa effectively ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien. On the legality of admission and permanent residency: The Court found a blatant abuse of immigration laws in the petitioner's entry and change of status. Her marriage to Banez was never disclosed to immigration authorities in her applications. The civil status of an alien applicant is a crucial factor that could influence the immigration authorities' discretion. The Court emphasized that the interest of an alien in being admitted or allowed to reside in the country is protected only as Congress may choose to protect it, and there is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted or to be given permanent residency. Marriage to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make an alien a citizen nor does it excuse failure to depart upon expiration of an extended stay. The entry of aliens and their admission as immigrants are not matters of right, even if married to Filipino citizens. The Court unequivocally stated that there was a "blatant abuse of our immigration laws" in effecting petitioner's entry and change of status. These privileges were obtained through misrepresentation, as the marriage to Banez was concealed from immigration authorities. The Court underscored that immigration laws are designed to protect national interests, and the admission of aliens is a privilege, not a right, subject to strict compliance with legal requirements. On the validity of the marriage: The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez under Islamic rites, as the core issue revolved around the legality of her admission and the subsequent deportation proceedings, and whether the power to deport had prescribed. The primary basis for the CID's action was the misrepresentation in her entry and status change, not solely the invalidity of the marriage under Philippine civil law.
Main Doctrine
The admission of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants are not matters of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens. The power to deport an alien may prescribe if not exercised within the statutory period, but the determination of whether the cause for deportation has arisen and whether the prescriptive period has tolled is crucial.