De la Paz v. Panis
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from a complaint filed in 1972 by the petitioners (Raymundo, Placido, Jose Jr., Iloina, Norita, Leonora, and Victoria de la Paz) in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch III, Olongapo City. The dispute, docketed as Civil Case No. 1133-0, concerned a 7,531-square meter parcel of land in Subic, Zambales. Petitioners claimed communal ownership based on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14807, while the private respondents asserted possession as actual occupants. Petitioners alleged that the private respondents illegally entered portions of the land and introduced improvements around 1970 or 1971. The private respondents admitted entering the property, believing it to be public domain, and claimed peaceful, open, and uninterrupted possession for over ten years. Procedural History: During pre-trial, some private respondents admitted petitioners' title, narrowing the issues to land identity, extent, and whether occupied areas fell within the titled property. A prior petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. L-38773) led to a compromise agreement in November 1974, approved by the Supreme Court, which stipulated a relocation survey. The survey report in June 1977 confirmed that private respondents occupied portions of the petitioners' titled land. Despite this, the respondent judge dismissed the petitioners' complaint on January 19, 1981, deeming the action to be one for ejectment, not recovery of possession. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on March 5, 1981. The petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus on May 29, 1981. The Petition: The petitioners seek to nullify the January 19, 1981 decision and compel the respondent judge to issue a writ of execution enforcing the compromise agreement approved in G.R. No. L-38773. They argue that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by disregarding the compromise agreement, holding himself without jurisdiction when he had it, and ignoring the relocation survey report. The petitioners contend that their action was a proper plenary action for recovery of possession, not ejectment, and that the respondent judge erred in dismissing it. They also argue that their petition was filed within a reasonable period after notice of the denial of their motion for reconsideration, despite the availability of an appeal, because strict adherence to the rule against certiorari as a substitute for a lost appeal would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Whether the action filed was one for recovery of possession or ejectment. Whether the compromise agreement and the relocation survey report should be given effect. Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus was the proper remedy.
Ruling
The Supreme Court nullified and set aside the decision dated January 19, 1981, in Civil Case No. 1133-0, except for the portions dismissing the private respondents' counterclaims and granting attorney's fees. The Court directed the respondent judge, or his successor, to issue a writ of execution enforcing the compromise agreement and the relocation survey report.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari and mandamus: The Court held that while a petition for certiorari is generally not a substitute for a lost appeal, it may be given due course when the trial judge commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the respondent judge's disregard of the compromise agreement approved by the Supreme Court, his erroneous assumption of lack of jurisdiction, and his ignoring of the court-appointed engineer's survey report constituted grave abuse of discretion. Strict adherence to the rule against certiorari as a substitute for appeal would result in a miscarriage of justice, thus warranting the extraordinary remedy. The petition was filed within a reasonable period after notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. On the nature of the action: The Court clarified that the action filed was a plenary action for recovery of possession, not an action for ejectment (forcible entry or unlawful detainer). Forcible entry requires deprivation of possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, none of which were alleged. Unlawful detainer requires possession that was initially lawful but became unlawful due to contract expiration or termination, which was not the case as no tenancy relationship existed between the parties. The respondent judge erred in classifying the case as one for ejectment, thereby wrongly assuming lack of jurisdiction. On the compromise agreement and survey report: The Court emphasized that the parties had agreed to a relocation survey and to respect its results. The respondent judge's decision completely ignored the compromise agreement approved by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-38773 and the subsequent survey report which confirmed that private respondents were occupying portions of the petitioners' titled land. The judge should have adhered to the issues defined during pre-trial and the outcome of the agreed-upon survey. On the jurisdiction of the respondent judge: The Court reiterated that the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has jurisdiction over plenary actions for recovery of possession. The respondent judge erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, as the action was properly filed before his court. The private respondents' claim that the land was part of the public domain was an allegation that was neither proven nor pursued at the trial and did not divest the court of jurisdiction.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari and mandamus may be given due course despite the availability of an appeal, if the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and strict adherence to procedural rules would result in a miscarriage of justice. The proper remedy for recovery of possession of land occupied by private respondents, where no tenancy relationship exists and possession is not unlawful from inception, is a plenary action for recovery of possession, not an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.