Gonzales v. Bersamin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainant Veronica Gonzales filed an administrative complaint against Judge Lucas P. Bersamin for grave misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and interlocutory orders, malicious refusal to implead her as an indispensable party, and dereliction of duty. These charges stemmed from Civil Case No. Q-94-21444, where Gina and Salvador Chan sued the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the cancellation of notices of levy. The complainant had obtained judgments in two prior cases against Zoilo and Rosalinda Cruz, leading to the annotation of notices of levy on a property owned by the Cruz spouses. The Chans claimed to have purchased the property from the Cruz spouses prior to the notices of levy, and their deed of sale was provisionally registered before the notices of levy. The Register of Deeds, while acknowledging the priority of the Chans' sale, stated it was his ministerial duty to transfer annotations. The Chans moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the Register of Deeds did not oppose. Procedural History: Respondent judge rendered a decision on October 13, 1994, ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the annotations of the notices of levy on TCT No. 50572. The complainant accused the judge of grave misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and interlocutory orders, malicious refusal to implead her as an indispensable party, and dereliction of duty, citing the judge's haste and disregard for due process and joinder of parties. The Petition: The complainant alleged that the judge favored the Chans, rendered an unjust judgment and interlocutory orders, refused to implead her as an indispensable party, and acted with dereliction of duty by summarily ordering the cancellation of her duly annotated notices of levy without affording her an opportunity to be heard.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave misconduct, knowingly rendered an unjust judgment and interlocutory orders, and was guilty of dereliction of duty; and whether the respondent judge maliciously refused to implead the complainant as an indispensable party. Whether the respondent judge erred in ordering the cancellation of the complainant's notices of levy without giving her notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Ruling
The administrative complaint is dismissed for lack of merit regarding the charges of grave misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and unjust interlocutory orders. However, the respondent judge is ADMONISHED to be more careful and diligent in the discharge of his judicial functions for failing to order notice to the complainant before ordering the cancellation of annotations on the certificate of title.
Ratio Decidendi
On the charges of grave misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, unjust interlocutory orders, refusal to implead the complainant, and dereliction of duty: The Court found no evidence on record to prove that the respondent judge unduly favored the spouses Chan or acted with partiality. Mere suspicion of partiality is insufficient. Furthermore, it was not shown that the judgment was unjust or contrary to law, nor that it was rendered with a conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice. The Court reiterated that suspicion alone is not enough to prove misconduct or rendering an unjust judgment. However, while the complainant had an adverse interest annotated on the certificate of title, the respondent judge should have ordered notice to be given to her. Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 explicitly requires that a court may hear and determine a petition for amendment or alteration of certificates of title, including the cancellation of a memorandum, only "after notice to all parties in interest." The respondent judge's contention that the case was not brought under Section 108 was without merit, as the action directly involved the cancellation of a memorandum on a certificate of title. The Court emphasized that in numerous cases involving the cancellation of annotations on certificates of title, notice to all parties in interest has been consistently required. Therefore, it was an error for the respondent judge to contend that no notice was required to be given to the complainant, who was clearly a party-in-interest affected by the petition. On the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before ordering the cancellation of the complainant's notices of levy: The Court found that while the complainant had an adverse interest annotated on the certificate of title, the respondent judge should have ordered notice to be given to her. Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 explicitly requires that a court may hear and determine a petition for amendment or alteration of certificates of title, including the cancellation of a memorandum, only "after notice to all parties in interest." The respondent judge's contention that the case was not brought under Section 108 was without merit, as the action directly involved the cancellation of a memorandum on a certificate of title. The Court emphasized that in numerous cases involving the cancellation of annotations on certificates of title, notice to all parties in interest has been consistently required. Therefore, it was an error for the respondent judge to contend that no notice was required to be given to the complainant, who was clearly a party-in-interest affected by the petition.
Main Doctrine
A judge should exercise prudence and circumspection by requiring notice to all parties in interest before ordering the cancellation of annotations on a certificate of title, as mandated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, to uphold the constitutional guarantee of due process.