Citytrust Banking Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondent Maria Anita Ruiz was dismissed by petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation on November 8, 1974, after refusing a designation as manager of the Quiapo branch, which she considered a demotion. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Procedural History: The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) initially ordered her reinstatement. Subsequent appeals led to decisions by the Office of the President, which ordered reinstatement as internal auditor with backwages. Upon modification, the Office of the President ordered reinstatement to a substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority and with benefits. Petitioner reinstated her as manager of the Auditing Department, which private respondent questioned as not substantially equivalent to her former position or the newly created resident inspector position. A Labor Arbiter ruled the Auditing Department manager position was not substantially equivalent and ordered reinstatement to Resident Inspector or a substantially equivalent position, with backwages and other benefits. The NLRC affirmed with modifications. Petitioner's subsequent appeals to the Supreme Court were dismissed. The NLRC issued a writ of execution for P1,219,520.52. After a recomputation, the total award was P1,304,054.52. Petitioner sought to limit backwages to three years, but the Supreme Court modified its earlier decision, ordering payment of backwages limited to three years without qualification or deduction. A further recomputation resulted in P1,339,888.05 in computed differentials. An alias writ of execution was issued, which petitioner sought to quash via a petition for injunction with the NLRC en banc, arguing the writ did not conform to the Supreme Court's resolution limiting backwages to three years. The Petition: Petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation filed a petition for certiorari to annul two resolutions of the NLRC denying its petition to stop the implementation of an alias writ of execution and its motion for reconsideration.
Issue(s)
Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for injunction, and whether the writ of execution conformed to the Supreme Court's resolution limiting backwages to three years without qualification or deduction. Whether private respondent is entitled to backwages beyond three years. Whether private respondent is entitled to salary differentials.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The writ of execution, as clarified by the Court, should include backwages for three years and salary differentials from the date of reinstatement to the date of retirement.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the injunction and the writ of execution: The Court held that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is generally not appealable. However, when a writ of execution varies the terms of the judgment, it can be questioned through a petition for injunction. Petitioner correctly filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC to challenge the alias writ of execution, as it claimed the writ did not conform to the Supreme Court's resolution limiting backwages to three years. The Solicitor General's argument that the order became final due to lack of appeal was deemed without merit because the challenge was based on the writ varying the judgment's terms. On the entitlement to backwages: The Court clarified that backwages are for earnings lost due to illegal dismissal, and the Supreme Court's resolution limiting backwages to three years applied to the period of illegal dismissal itself, from November 8, 1974, to August 13, 1978. This limitation was imposed to avoid delays in litigation. On the entitlement to salary differentials: Private respondent was also entitled to reinstatement to her former position or a substantially equivalent one. Since she was reinstated to a lower-paying position (manager of the Auditing Department) which was not substantially equivalent to her original position (internal auditor/resident inspector), she was entitled to salary differentials for the period after her reinstatement. These differentials represent the difference between the salary of the resident inspector and the salary she actually received as manager of the Auditing Department. The Court noted that private respondent retired on March 1, 1991. Therefore, reinstatement was no longer academic. She should be paid the difference in pay (salary differentials) between a resident inspector and a manager of the Auditing Department from August 14, 1978, up to her retirement on March 1, 1991. This amount is in addition to the award for backwages limited to three years, as previously determined by the Court. The alias writ of execution, which was the subject of the petition, should have included these salary differentials.
Main Doctrine
An order of execution of a final and executory judgment is not appealable; however, a claim that the writ of execution varies the terms of the judgment may be questioned through a petition for injunction. Backwages are for earnings lost due to illegal dismissal, and are distinct from salary differentials which arise when an employee is reinstated to a lower-paying position.