Aruego, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights filed by minors Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother Luz M. Fabian, against Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres. The complaint alleged that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr. had an extramarital relationship with Luz M. Fabian from whom Antonia and Evelyn were born. The minors sought to be declared illegitimate children of Jose M. Aruego, Sr., to be recognized as compulsory heirs, and to receive their share of his estate. The petitioners, the children of Gloria A. Torres, denied these allegations. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, rendered a judgment on June 15, 1992, declaring Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian, entitling her to a share in the estate. Evelyn Fabian was not declared as such. The petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration, arguing that the trial court lost jurisdiction due to the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by E.O. 227). This motion was denied. The trial court refused to give due course to the petitioners' appeal, deeming it filed out of time. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for lack of merit on August 31, 1993. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: The petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petition before it did not involve a question of jurisdiction and that their remedy was not a lost appeal. The core of their argument is that the Family Code, specifically Article 175 in relation to Article 172, should govern the action for compulsory recognition. They argue that under the Family Code, such an action based on open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child must be filed during the lifetime of the alleged parent without exception, and since the complaint was filed after the putative father's death, the action had prescribed, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction. They assert that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the Family Code retroactively, despite the ruling in Uyguangco, which they claim was superseded or modified by the Family Code.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petition filed before it did not involve a question of jurisdiction. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code should not be applied retroactively to the instant case. Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint due to the effectivity of the Family Code, and whether the action was barred by prescription.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993, are AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On jurisdiction: The Court affirmed the principle that once jurisdiction attaches, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the complaint. The passage of the Family Code did not cause the loss of this jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the petition before it did not involve a question of jurisdiction that would warrant a different remedy than an appeal, which had already been lost by petitioners. On the applicability of the Family Code and vested rights: The Court held that the action for compulsory recognition was filed under the Civil Code. The advent of the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, did not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction. The filing of the complaint under the Civil Code vested in the private respondent her right to have the case proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time. Applying Article 175 of the Family Code retroactively would prejudice this vested right, which is protected by Article 256 of the Family Code. Therefore, the provisions of the Civil Code, specifically Article 285, should govern the case. The Court reiterated its ruling in Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, which held that the right of action is vested by the filing of the complaint and cannot be impaired by a new law. On the trial court's jurisdiction and prescription under Article 285 of the Civil Code: The Court found that the action was not barred by prescription. Under Article 285 of the Civil Code, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the child may file the action within four years from attaining majority. Since the private respondent was a minor when the action was filed, and her presumed father had died during her minority, the action was filed within the exception provided by law. Thus, the trial court correctly applied Article 285 of the Civil Code.
Main Doctrine
The application of the Family Code, which took effect after the filing of the complaint, cannot prejudice the vested right of the private respondent to have her case decided under the Civil Code, as the filing of the complaint under the prior law vested her right to have the case adjudicated according to the law then in force.