People v. Andres
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Romy Andres was charged with four counts of rape against Ruwerose A. Corpuz. The alleged offenses occurred in February 1988 (two counts), April 1989, and May 10, 1989. Andres pleaded not guilty to all charges. 2. Procedural History: The four cases were consolidated and jointly tried. On September 28, 1993, the Regional Trial Court acquitted Andres in three of the cases (Criminal Cases No. 777-19, 778-19, and 779-19) but convicted him in Criminal Case No. 776-19, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay moral damages. This appeal concerns only the conviction in Criminal Case No. 776-19. 3. The Petition: The accused-appellant, Romy Andres, filed an appeal arguing that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of rape despite the complainant's implied consent to the sexual act. The Supreme Court is reviewing the conviction for statutory rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertains to sexual intercourse with a female under twelve years of age, where consent is immaterial.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of rape despite the alleged implied consent of the complainant to the sexual act, considering the elements of statutory rape. Whether the elements of statutory rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established, focusing on the evidence presented.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, upholding the conviction of the appellant for rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of implied consent and statutory rape: The Supreme Court held that the appellant's argument regarding implied consent deserves scant consideration. The conviction was based on paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines statutory rape. In this specific type of rape, consent is immaterial. The law presumes that a child below twelve years of age cannot give intelligent consent to a sexual act. Therefore, the mere fact of having sexual relations with a girl below twelve years old constitutes rape, and the voluntariness on the part of the girl is not a defense. On the elements of statutory rape: The Court reiterated that to hold an accused guilty of rape under Article 335, paragraph 3, two elements must be established: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. It was undisputed that the complainant was eleven years old in February 1988, the date of the offense. The Court found the complainant's testimony credible, detailing how she was sexually assaulted. This testimony was corroborated by the medico-legal report, which indicated an old laceration in the hymen, laxity of the fourchet, and the vagina's ability to admit two probing fingers without resistance, all evidencing penetration by the male organ. The Court emphasized that it is unlikely for a young, sexually inexperienced girl to fabricate such a story and undergo examination and trial unless she was seeking justice.
Main Doctrine
Under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code (statutory rape), the element of consent is immaterial. The law presumes that a child below twelve years old cannot give intelligent consent to a sexual act, making the act of having sexual relations with such a child rape regardless of voluntariness.