People v. Bacang
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Accused Leopoldo Bacang, Gerry Brako, Arnold, Francisco Palacios, Tata Doe, William Casido, Mario, and Franklin Alcorin were found guilty of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 45 (Bais City), and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. William Casido and Franklin Alcorin appealed their conviction to the Supreme Court. Procedural History: The accused-appellants filed their Appellant's Brief, and the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Brief for the Appellee, seeking affirmance of the RTC decision. Subsequently, the accused-appellants filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal without stating any reason. The Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that the accused-appellants were released on Conditional Pardon on January 25, 1996. The Court directed the submission of certified true copies of the Conditional Pardon and release orders. The Petition: The accused-appellants, William Casido and Franklin Alcorin, filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal while their case was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court received information that they were granted conditional pardons during the pendency of their appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the conditional pardons granted to the accused-appellants during the pendency of their appeal are valid. Whether the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal should be granted.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the accused-appellants' Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. It directed the Bureau of Corrections to effect the re-arrest of William Casido and Franklin Alcorin and to reconfine them. The Court also required the officers of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for processing the pardon applications despite the pending appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the conditional pardons: The Court held that the conditional pardons granted to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin on January 19, 1996, are void. This is because the pardons were issued during the pendency of their appeal, which is in clear violation of law and established jurisprudence. The Court reiterated its pronouncement in People vs. Salle (1995) that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of their appeal. The Court emphasized that agencies concerned must require proof that the accused has not appealed or has withdrawn their appeal before processing any pardon application. The acceptance of a pardon does not operate as an abandonment of the appeal, and release before withdrawal of appeal renders responsible officers administratively liable. The rule explicitly states that pardons extended after January 31, 1995, during the pendency of the grantee's appeal are void. On the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal: The Court denied the motion to withdraw the appeal. Given that the conditional pardons were found to be void, the accused-appellants remain under the jurisdiction of the Court. Their release based on void pardons does not negate the pendency of their appeal. The Court's directive for re-arrest and reconfine ment underscores the invalidity of their release and the continued pendency of their appeal before the Supreme Court. The Court also initiated proceedings for contempt against the officers responsible for processing the pardon applications.
Main Doctrine
The grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of their appeal from a conviction by the trial court is void. Applications for pardon should not be acted upon unless the appeal is withdrawn, and agencies concerned must require proof of withdrawal. Release of an accused by virtue of pardon before withdrawal of appeal renders responsible officers administratively liable.