Cabada v. Alunan
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: A complaint for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was filed against SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo G. de Guzman by Mario Valdez. The Philippine National Police Eighth Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) filed an administrative charge of Grave Misconduct and initiated summary dismissal proceedings. The Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 found the petitioners guilty and ordered their dismissal, with Special Order No. 174 being issued accordingly. Procedural History: Petitioners claimed they were not formally furnished a copy of the decision but received Special Order No. 174. Petitioner Cabada stated he filed a motion for reconsideration which was not acted upon, and he requested it be treated as an appeal to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB 8). RAB 8 affirmed the Regional Director's decision and later denied their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners received the resolution denying reconsideration on January 26, 1995. The Petition: Petitioners filed an "Appeal" and a "Petition for Review" with the Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM. The NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due course to their appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, citing that the RAB's decision and resolution had become final and executory. This decision of the NAPOLCOM is the subject of the instant special civil action for certiorari.
Issue(s)
Whether the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners' appeal and petition for review of the RAB 8's decision and resolution. Whether the special civil action for certiorari was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the National Police Commission dated 24 March 1995 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government is DIRECTED to RESOLVE with reasonable dispatch the appeal and petition for review of petitioners SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE Guzman, respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994 and resolution of 25 October 1994 of the Regional Appellate Board, Eight Regional Command, if the same were filed on time.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of NAPOLCOM's jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion: The Court held that the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petitioners' appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides that if a Regional Appellate Board (RAB) fails to decide an appeal within sixty days, the decision becomes final and executory, but the aggrieved party may still appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The law is silent on appeals from decisions rendered within the reglementary period, but complementary civil service laws, specifically Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and its implementing rules, indicate that appeals from bureau or office head decisions may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In this context, the Secretary of the DILG has the authority to act on appeals from RAB decisions. The NAPOLCOM, as established by Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990, exercises appellate jurisdiction only through the National Appellate Board (NAB) for disciplinary actions imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and through the RAB for administrative cases against policemen and claims for police benefits. It does not possess appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB themselves. Therefore, the NAPOLCOM's denial of due course was an act without jurisdiction. Furthermore, Commissioner Alexis Canonizado could not have acted singly for the NAPOLCOM, as it is a collegial body. On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies: The Court found the plea of the Office of the Solicitor General regarding prematurity due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies to be untenable. The petitioners had appealed to the Secretary of the DILG, who is the proper authority to act on appeals from RAB decisions, as construed from Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 and the applicable civil service laws. If the Secretary of the DILG had been the one to deny due course or dismiss the appeal, then the next step would have been an appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 and Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Since the NAPOLCOM, an entity without appellate jurisdiction over the RAB's decision, made the denial, the petitioners could properly invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The Court noted that the NAPOLCOM's decision was a patent nullity, thus dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration before filing the certiorari petition.
Main Doctrine
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) lacks appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Regional Appellate Board (RAB) if such decisions were rendered within the reglementary period. Appeals from RAB decisions, whether rendered within or beyond the 60-day period, should be directed to the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Failure to exhaust this administrative remedy renders a subsequent petition for certiorari premature.