Reyes v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes, the incumbent mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, was found guilty of administrative charges by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and ordered removed from office. Earlier, Reyes had filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging lack of due process, which resulted in a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from serving its decision. The TRO expired, and subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon Reyes and his counsel were refused. Procedural History: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to vacate his position, which was also refused service. Reyes then filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor. Rogelio de Castro, a registered voter, sought Reyes' disqualification based on Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division disqualified Reyes and cancelled his certificate of candidacy. Despite this, Reyes was proclaimed the winner in the May 8, 1995 elections. The COMELEC en banc denied Reyes' motion for reconsideration and set aside his proclamation. Julius O. Garcia, who obtained the second highest number of votes, intervened, seeking his proclamation as mayor. The COMELEC en banc denied Garcia's petition, citing existing jurisprudence. The Petition: Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC, arguing that the administrative decision was not final and executory and that his election rendered the charges moot. Garcia also filed a petition for certiorari, contending that the COMELEC should have decided his case before the elections and that the votes for Reyes should be considered stray.
Issue(s)
Whether the administrative decision removing petitioner Renato U. Reyes from office had become final and executory despite his refusal to receive a copy thereof. Whether petitioner Reyes' election to a new term rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner Reyes and cancelling his certificate of candidacy. Whether petitioner Julius O. Garcia, as the second placer, should be proclaimed mayor following the disqualification of the winning candidate.
Ruling
The petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions.
Ratio Decidendi
On the finality of the administrative decision: The Court held that service of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's decision was deemed completed despite Reyes' refusal to receive it. Attempts to serve the decision personally and by registered mail were made, and the refusal of Reyes and his counsel to accept the decision constituted a waiver of their right to have a copy served upon them. Under the Rules of Court, service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery. The failure to serve was attributable to Reyes, thus service was validly completed. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not interrupt the finality of the administrative decision, especially since the TRO issued by the RTC expired without a preliminary injunction being issued. Consequently, the decision became final and executory on April 2, 1995, prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. On the mootness of administrative charges due to election: The Court distinguished the present case from Aguinaldo v. Santos, where reelection was held to condone prior misconduct because the term expired before removal. In this case, Reyes was validly removed from office before the election, and Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 explicitly disqualifies those removed from office in an administrative case from running for any elective local position. The Court emphasized that Section 40(b) could not be given retroactive effect, but its application here was prospective as the removal occurred before the election and the law was already in effect. On the COMELEC's disqualification of Reyes: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion. The COMELEC correctly applied Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, as Reyes was validly removed from office by a final and executory administrative decision. The Court also noted that Reyes was given ample opportunity to file his answer in the administrative case but resorted to dilatory tactics, waiving his right to present evidence. His claim of not being given a chance to be heard was belied by the records showing he was given opportunities to cross-examine witnesses, which he failed to avail himself of. On the proclamation of the second placer: The Court reiterated its settled jurisprudence that the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is disqualified. The Court cited Aquino v. COMELEC, stating that it would be speculative to assume the second placer would have received the votes of the disqualified candidate, as the election conditions would have substantially changed. The votes cast for the disqualified candidate are not considered stray, void, or meaningless, and the disqualification cannot retroact to invalidate those votes.
Main Doctrine
A candidate removed from office as a result of an administrative case is disqualified from running for any elective local position under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). The finality of the administrative decision is established even if the respondent refuses to receive the copy of the decision, as service is deemed completed upon valid attempts to deliver or mail the decision. Furthermore, election to a new term does not render the administrative charges moot if the decision of removal became final and executory prior to the election.