Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from running for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna, based on a prior conviction for violation of P.D. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) convicted him on June 1, 1990, a decision affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on November 14, 1990, and which became final on January 18, 1991. Procedural History: The COMELEC, in SPA No. 95-047, declared petitioner disqualified, holding that the offense of fencing involves moral turpitude. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, arguing that probation granted by the MTC on December 21, 1994, suspended the legal consequences of his conviction, was denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify the COMELEC resolutions, alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. Whether a grant of probation affects the applicability of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed the COMELEC resolutions. The Court held that fencing involves moral turpitude and that probation does not negate the finality of conviction for purposes of disqualification.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude: The Court determined that fencing, defined under Section 2 of P.D. 1612, inherently involves moral turpitude. The elements of fencing include the commission of robbery or theft, the accused's involvement in buying, receiving, possessing, or dealing with the proceeds of such crimes, knowledge or constructive knowledge that the property is derived from robbery or theft, and intent to gain. The third element, knowledge or constructive knowledge, directly implies a "baseness, vileness, or depravity" contrary to accepted rules of right and duty, justice, and honesty, as it involves the deliberate invasion of another's property rights for gain, akin to the perpetrator of the original crime. The Court noted that while crimes are generally classified as mala in se (involving moral turpitude) or mala prohibita (not involving moral turpitude), this classification is not always definitive, and the specific facts and circumstances, or the elements of the crime itself, must be analyzed. In fencing, the act of dealing with stolen property, knowing or having reason to know its illicit origin, demonstrates a disregard for the property rights of others and for societal norms of honesty and justice. The presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612, that mere possession of stolen goods is prima facie evidence of fencing, further supports the inherent immorality of the act. On Whether a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)'s applicability: The Court ruled that a grant of probation does not affect the applicability of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Probation, as provided for by law, serves only to suspend the execution of the sentence and not to nullify the conviction itself. The conviction for fencing, which was established to involve moral turpitude, remains valid and subsisting for purposes of disqualification under Section 40(a). The Court clarified that a judgment of conviction attains finality when the accused applies for probation, even if its execution is suspended pending the resolution of the probation application. Therefore, the petitioner's conviction, having become final prior to his application for probation, continued to be a valid ground for disqualification under the Local Government Code, irrespective of the probation granted.
Main Doctrine
A conviction for fencing under P.D. 1612 involves moral turpitude, rendering the offender disqualified from running for elective local positions under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. A grant of probation does not negate the conviction's finality for purposes of disqualification.