Mayuga v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a parcel of land located at Granate Street, Sta. Ana, Manila. Private respondent RPN Realty, Inc. claims ownership of this land, having purchased it and obtained Transfer Certificates of Title in 1992. Petitioners, however, have occupied the land and constructed houses thereon. They assert that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession for sixty years, paying rent to previous owners, and that the land is designated as an Urban Land Reform Zone by the National Housing Authority. 2. Procedural History: RPN Realty, Inc. filed an action for recovery of possession against the petitioners in January 1993. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Manila, initially ruled in favor of RPN Realty, Inc. on January 10, 1995, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay attorney's fees. This decision became final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued. Petitioners later filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment, alleging they were unaware of the decision due to their former counsel's negligence. The RTC denied this motion on November 16, 1995. Subsequently, RPN Realty, Inc. moved for demolition. On January 3, 1996, the RTC granted this motion, declared petitioners as professional squatters, exempted RPN Realty, Inc. from the procedures under Republic Act No. 7279, and issued an alias writ of execution and demolition. Petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the January 3, 1996 order and the alleged denial of their appeal from the order denying relief from judgment. The CA dismissed this petition and affirmed the RTC's orders. 3. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They argue that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision when the case before it was a special civil action for mandamus and certiorari, not an appeal on the merits. Petitioners contend that the CA should have compelled the RTC to give due course to their appeal from the order denying their motion for relief from judgment and should have annulled the January 3, 1996 order authorizing the alias writ of execution and demolition. They assert that the CA incorrectly ruled on the merits and failed to recognize that the filing of their petition for relief and subsequent appeal should have stayed execution proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not dismiss the appeal from the order denying the motion for relief from judgment; and whether mandamus will lie to compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal from the order denying the motion for relief from judgment. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision when the case was not properly before it on appeal; and on the grounds for relief from judgment. Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated January 3, 1996, authorizing the issuance of an alias writ of execution and special order of demolition; and on the effect of appeal from an order denying relief.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The trial court's judgment on the merits stands, and the order granting the issuance of the alias writ of execution is upheld. Costs are against the petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged dismissal of the appeal and the propriety of mandamus: The Court held that mandamus will lie to compel a judge or public officer to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law. However, petitioners failed to show that the trial court refused to accept their notice of appeal or denied it. The January 3, 1996 order merely granted the private respondent's motion for declaration as professional squatters and for an alias writ of execution; it did not expressly or impliedly deny the petitioners' appeal from the order denying relief from judgment. Furthermore, the notice of appeal was deemed perfected after the fifteenth day, not subject to the trial court's approval. Petitioners also did not allege that the trial court neglected to transmit the records to the appellate court. Thus, the cause of action for mandamus was not proven, and the CA correctly dismissed the petition. On the Court of Appeals' treatment of the petition and the grounds for relief from judgment: The Court found that the CA correctly treated the petition for mandamus and certiorari as the appeal itself from the order denying relief from judgment. The CA correctly ruled that the failure of petitioners' former counsel to notify them of the adverse decision, leading to the loss of their right to appeal, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Established jurisprudence holds that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment does not justify setting aside a valid and regular judgment. Relief is not granted to a party whose loss of remedy is due to their own negligence. On the affirmation of the trial court's judgment and the execution proceedings; and on the effect of appeal from an order denying relief: Since the ground for relief from judgment was not well-taken, the trial court's judgment on the merits remained valid. The CA did not rule on the merits but confirmed the existence of the final and executory judgment. The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the filing of their petition for relief and the subsequent appeal stayed the execution proceedings. Execution proceedings are not automatically stayed by a petition for relief; a writ of preliminary injunction, as provided under Section 5 of Rule 38, is necessary to suspend execution. The filing of a petition for relief presupposes that the judgment is already final and executory, and unless restrained, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of execution. The Court clarified that execution proceedings are also not stayed by the perfection of an appeal from an order denying relief from judgment. Unlike ordinary appeals where perfection divests the trial court of jurisdiction because the judgment has not yet attained finality, an appeal from an order denying relief under Rule 38 concerns a judgment that is already final and executory. The only means to suspend execution in such cases is through a writ of preliminary injunction, which the petitioners failed to secure.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a petition for relief from judgment and the subsequent appeal from the order denying relief do not automatically stay execution proceedings; a writ of preliminary injunction is required to suspend execution. Furthermore, the negligence of counsel in failing to notify the client of an adverse judgment, resulting in the loss of the right to appeal, is generally not a ground for relief from judgment as notice to counsel is binding upon the client.