Santos v. Doblada, Jr.

A.M. No. P-97-1252 · 1997-10-16 · J. VITUG, J.: · Primary: Ethics; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Complainant Orestes R. Santos, Project Manager of Greenridge Executive Village, charged Deputy Sheriff Norberto V. Doblada, Jr. with abuse of authority in relation to Civil Case No. 34242. The case involved a writ of possession issued on July 21, 1994, in favor of defendants Antonina Guido, et al., concerning portions of a property not occupied by bona fide occupants with registered titles or with lengths of possession, nor by squatters. Procedural History: The trial court, through Judge Fernando L. Gerona, Jr., issued an order on July 21, 1994, reconsidering its June 21, 1994 order and directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the defendants, to be enforced by the respondent Sheriff. The writ of possession was issued on the same date, commanding the Sheriff to place the defendants in possession within sixty days. The Petition: Complainant alleged that on February 29, 1996, the respondent Sheriff, accompanied by police, military personnel, and private security guards, entered Greenridge Executive Village without legal authority and with grave abuse of power. The Sheriff allegedly threatened subdivision guards and ordered the occupation of the front portion of the subdivision by private security guards, placing tents and posting an announcement. This was allegedly done without securing an alias writ of possession and despite the directive that the writ only covered specific portions of the property.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent Sheriff committed abuse of authority in the implementation of the writ of possession. Whether the respondent Sheriff failed to comply with the requirements for the return of the writ of execution.

Ruling

The Supreme Court found the respondent Sheriff guilty of grave abuse of authority and imposed a fine of Two Thousand Pesos with a stern warning.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of abuse of authority: The Court reiterated the principle that a writ of execution has a life of only sixty days from its receipt by the sheriff. All acts performed by the sheriff after the expiration of this period are considered null and void, as the writ becomes functus officio. In this case, the respondent Sheriff implemented the writ on February 29, 1996, which was approximately one and a half years after its issuance on July 21, 1994. This clearly violated Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On the issue of failure to comply with the return of the writ: Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court mandates that the sheriff must set forth in writing all proceedings by virtue of the writ and file it with the clerk or judge within not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days after receipt. The respondent's contention that the implementation did not expire due to continuing execution proceedings lacked legal basis. The Court found that the Sheriff failed in his duty to execute the order of the Court in accordance with the governing law. The Court adopted the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to impose a fine and a stern warning against similar actuations.

Main Doctrine

A writ of execution is functus officio after the lapse of its sixty-day life, and all acts performed by the sheriff thereafter are nullities. The sheriff has a duty to make a return of the writ within the prescribed period, and failure to do so constitutes a breach of duty.

Access audio review, related cases, codal links, and more.

Open LexMatePH →