First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. v. Secretary Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns a labor dispute between First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. (Fil Transit), a public utility, and its employees represented by the Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Fil Transit-National Federation of Labor (NM-NFL). The dispute escalated when the union filed notices of strike alleging unfair labor practices, massive dismissal of union officers and members, coercion, and violations of the right to self-organization. These allegations led to two strikes by the union, one on June 17, 1986, and another on July 27, 1986, with the latter being lifted on August 2, 1986. The petitioner contends that the strikes were illegal due to the commission of violent and criminal acts by the strikers, including hijacking buses, barricading the terminal, puncturing tires, cutting wires, and using molotov bombs. Procedural History: The Secretary of Labor and Employment initially assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and, on September 16, 1986, ordered the striking employees to return to work and the petitioner to accept them. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, and a subsequent petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied, leading to the lifting of a temporary restraining order. A writ of execution was issued on November 24, 1987, to enforce the return-to-work order. The union then sought backwages, and a sheriff's report indicated that only 66 out of approximately 160 employees returned to work. The Secretary of Labor issued an order on May 15, 1990, awarding backwages and directing compliance with the return-to-work directive, which was affirmed by a subsequent order on August 27, 1991, after denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. A petition for certiorari questioning this order was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of grave abuse of discretion. The union subsequently filed a position paper seeking backwages, separation pay, and attorney's fees, while the petitioner requested the inclusion of the strike's legality as an issue and extensions to file its position paper. The Petition: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the July 23, 1992 order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, which declared the strike legal and awarded three years of backwages and separation pay to the dismissed striking employees. The petitioner argues that the Secretary erred in declaring the strike legal, asserting that the union failed to comply with mandatory strike vote and reporting requirements, and that the strike was illegal due to violent acts committed by strikers. The petitioner also contends that the Secretary erred in disregarding the sheriff's report, finding that management refused to comply with the return-to-work order, and awarding backwages without basis. The petitioner maintains that it substantially complied with the return-to-work order, and that unreasonable requirements imposed were valid management prerogatives, while others were inappropriate for reinstatement. The core of the petition is that the strike was illegal, and therefore, the strikers, particularly those involved in illegal acts, should have lost their employment status, and backwages should not have been awarded.
Issue(s)
Whether the strike declared by the Union was legal. Whether the strikers, by engaging in violent, illegal, and criminal acts, lost their employment status. Whether petitioner refused to comply with the Return to Work Order. Whether the strikers are entitled to backwages and separation pay.
Ruling
The questioned order of the Secretary of Labor is SET ASIDE. Union officers who participated in the illegal strike and those who participated in the commission of illegal acts are deemed to have lost their employment status. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the employees who did not participate in the commission of illegal acts during the strike separation pay.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Legality of the Strike: The Court held that the strike was illegal. The petitioner's contention that no strike vote was taken before the strike was called was not sufficiently rebutted by the Union. The Secretary of Labor's statement that a strike vote was obtained lacked basis and supporting evidence. Furthermore, even if a strike vote was taken, the Union failed to observe the mandatory seven-day strike ban after the strike vote results should have been reported to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) before staging the strike on June 17, 1986. The Court emphasized that the requirements of a cooling-off period and a seven-day strike ban must both be complied with, as mandated by Article 263(c) and (f) of the Labor Code. The argument that good faith could excuse non-compliance was rejected, as the Union's actions, including striking during ongoing conciliation meetings and agreeing to meet on the day of the strike, demonstrated bad faith. The ruling in Ferrer v. CIR was distinguished as it involved a belief in good faith of unfair labor practices, which was not established here. On the Loss of Employment Status due to Illegal Acts: The Court agreed with the respondent Secretary that responsibility for illegal acts committed during a strike must be on an individual basis, not collective, unless the acts are pervasive and widespread by design or policy. However, the Court found that the strike was attended by pervasive and widespread violence, including hijacking of buses, barricading the terminal, puncturing tires, cutting wires, and using molotov bombs. Despite this, the Court reiterated that only union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal, and criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status, in accordance with Article 264(a)(3) of the Labor Code. Union members merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently, citing Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC. On Compliance with the Return to Work Order: The Court found that petitioner substantially complied with the Return to Work Order. The imposition of certain requirements for reinstatement, such as medical examinations, NBI/Police/Barangay clearances, and driver's licenses, were considered reasonable management prerogatives to ensure the fitness and qualifications of returning employees, especially after a significant lapse of time. However, other requirements like a cash bond, birth/baptismal certificates, and high school diplomas were deemed unreasonable as they were more appropriate for new hires. Despite these unreasonable requirements, the Court ruled that their imposition did not amount to a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order or an illegal lockout, as petitioner did accept 66 employees back to work. The Sheriff's return indicated that the employees who did not return on the agreed date of March 8, 1988, were those who failed to report, not those who were refused readmission. The Court noted that in Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc. v. Norton & Harrison Co., unjustified refusal of striking employees to return to work was considered a waiver of their right to reinstatement. On Entitlement to Backwages and Separation Pay: Consequently, the award of backwages was set aside as it was based on the alleged refusal of the employer to comply with the Return to Work Order, which the Court found to be unsubstantiated. Employees not guilty of illegal acts and entitled to reinstatement would only be entitled to backwages if they were refused readmission, which was not the case for all. However, employees entitled to reinstatement who did not participate in illegal acts should be given separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, as reinstatement was no longer feasible after the prolonged litigation. This separation pay should be computed only up to March 8, 1988, the agreed date for return to work. Those who failed to return on that date would not be entitled to separation pay after March 8, 1988.
Main Doctrine
A strike declared without a valid strike vote and without observance of the mandatory seven-day strike ban renders the strike illegal. While acts of violence during a strike may render it illegal, responsibility for such acts must be individual, not collective, unless pervasive and widespread by design or policy. Non-compliance with a return-to-work order may warrant backwages, but unreasonable conditions imposed for reinstatement do not automatically constitute refusal to comply if some employees were accepted.