Lalican v. Vergara
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information was filed against Epifanio Lalican and others for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, for allegedly possessing 1,800 board feet of assorted lumber without lawful authority or permit. Procedural History: The accused pleaded not guilty. Lalican filed a motion to quash, arguing that the information charged a non-existent crime because Section 68 refers to "timber" and not "lumber," which he claimed is a processed product. The prosecution opposed, stating that excluding lumber would allow circumvention of the law. The RTC, presided by Judge Sabas R. Acosta, initially quashed the information, holding that the law distinguishes between timber and lumber and that lumber, being a finished product, does not pose the same danger to forests. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, highlighting that the DENR primer includes processed timber as timber and that the accused's permits were expired and documents were irregular. The case was later assigned to Branch 52, presided by Judge Filomeno A. Vergara, who set aside the quashal order, ruling that lumber is a forest product and its possession without legal documents is prohibited. Lalican's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Lalican filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in setting aside the quashal order and denying his motion for reconsideration, as Section 68 does not include "lumber."
Issue(s)
Whether the charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. Whether the denial of the motion to quash is correctible by a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, enjoining the lower court to proceed with the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether possession of lumber is covered by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705: The Supreme Court held that Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, penalizes both the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products without authority, and the possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. While the Revised Forestry Code does not explicitly define "timber" or "lumber," it includes "timber" in the definition of "forest products" under Section 3(q) and defines "processing plant" in Section 3(aa) as a facility used for processing logs and other forest raw materials into "lumber." This indicates that "lumber" is a processed log or timber. The Court reiterated the principle that words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary. In this context, "lumber" is commonly understood as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." The Court emphasized that Section 68 makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, applying the principle of ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish). To exclude the possession of "lumber" from the purview of Section 68 would emasculate the law and allow for easy circumvention, as individuals could cut timber, process it into lumber, and escape prosecution. The phrase "other forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber, and its inclusion in Section 68 would merely avoid tautology. Furthermore, the Court noted that even if lumber were not considered timber, it is undeniably a "wood" and thus a "forest product" under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, and its possession without legal documents is equally prohibited. The Court also pointed out that the accused failed to present the necessary legal documents for the possession of the seized lumber, such as permits, sale invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts, and that their presented permit was expired. On the issue of whether the denial of the motion to quash is correctible by certiorari and prohibition: The Supreme Court reiterated that certiorari is not the proper remedy when a motion to quash an information is denied. The established procedure is for the accused to enter a plea, proceed to trial, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal the conviction, which would include the denial of the motion to quash. A denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed nor be the subject of a petition for certiorari, unless it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court found no patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The petition was not filed at the earliest opportunity, and the information was not patently defective nor had the offense prescribed. The Court generally frowns upon the use of certiorari to review interlocutory orders, as it would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition was dismissed.
Main Doctrine
Possession of lumber, being a processed forest product, is covered by Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without legal documents. To exclude lumber would emasculate the law and allow circumvention.