People v. Franco
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On August 9, 1991, the lifeless body of Aurelio Cuya, a security guard at Dunkin' Donut, was discovered. The total sales of P10,000.00 from the previous day were reported missing from the establishment. The security agency supervisor suspected the appellant, Julito Franco, and informed the police. The police interviewed Maribel Diong and Hilda Dolera, who allegedly stated that the appellant confessed to them about killing someone on the evening of August 8, 1991. Based on these alleged statements, the police apprehended Franco on August 10, 1991. Allegedly recovered from him were P2,415.00 and a handgun from his cousin's residence. Franco's extra-judicial confession was taken on August 12, 1991, allegedly with the assistance of a lawyer and voluntarily. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Julito Franco y Tianson of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The RTC ordered him to indemnify Dunkin' Donut and the heirs of Aurelio Cuya. The conviction was principally based on his alleged extra-judicial confession. The Petition: Appellant Franco appealed his conviction, contending that the trial court erred in convicting him based on illegally obtained evidence. The Solicitor General recommended acquittal, arguing that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant based on an extra-judicial confession that was not formally offered in evidence. Whether the trial court erred in considering hearsay testimony regarding the appellant's alleged confession to third parties. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, acquitting appellant Julito Franco y Tianson. The Court ordered his immediate release unless held for other legal grounds.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility and consideration of the extra-judicial confession: The Supreme Court held that the trial court committed a grave error in considering the appellant's extra-judicial confession as the basis for his conviction. The Court reiterated the fundamental rule that courts shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Although the confession was identified and marked as Exhibit "N" during the cross-examination of the appellant, this identification and marking do not equate to a formal offer of evidence. The prosecution failed to formally offer the confession, and its contents were not recited by the appellant in his testimony. Therefore, the trial court's undue consideration and reliance on this unoffered confession were improper and rendered it inadmissible for conviction purposes. On the admissibility and consideration of hearsay testimony: The Court found that the testimony of Police Investigator Pat. Nestor Napao-it regarding the appellant's alleged confession to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong constituted hearsay evidence. While Pat. Napao-it's testimony on the conduct of the investigation was admissible as it was based on his personal knowledge, his narration of what others allegedly told him about the appellant's confession was not. The Court emphasized that hearsay testimony, even if not objected to, has no probative value. Furthermore, the admission of the sworn statements of Diong and Dolera (Exhibits "F" to "I") was only for the purpose of establishing their execution, not the truth of the facts asserted therein, as they were not presented in court to affirm their contents. Their admission as proof of the facts asserted would violate the appellant's constitutional right of confrontation. On the sufficiency of evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt: The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent. No witness directly observed the commission of the crime by the appellant. The prosecution's case relied heavily on an unoffered extra-judicial confession and hearsay testimony, both of which were deemed inadmissible or lacking probative value. The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses (Dunkin Donut employee, the physician, and the victim's wife) did not directly implicate the appellant in the commission of the crime. Consequently, the Court found that the appellant's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Main Doctrine
An extra-judicial confession, even if identified and marked as an exhibit, cannot be considered by the court if it was not formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. Hearsay testimony, even if not objected to, has no probative value. The failure to formally offer evidence is a violation of the rule that courts shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and it deprives the accused of their constitutional right to confrontation.