Garcia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119063 · 1997-01-27 · J. DAVIDE, JR., J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a charge of bigamy filed by Jose G. Garcia against his wife, Adela Teodora P. Santos. Garcia alleged that Santos, while still legally married to Reynaldo Quiroca, contracted a second marriage with him. The information for bigamy was filed after Garcia claimed to have discovered this prior marriage. Procedural History: Jose G. Garcia filed an affidavit of complaint for bigamy, among other offenses, against his wife. An information for bigamy was subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The private respondent filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that the offense had prescribed. The RTC granted the motion, finding that the offense prescribed in 15 years and that Garcia discovered the first marriage in 1974, making the filing of the information in 1991 too late. The RTC denied Garcia's motion for reconsideration, holding that the private respondent's trips abroad did not interrupt the prescriptive period. Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC's decision, agreeing that the offense had prescribed and that prescription could be invoked even on appeal. The Petition: Petitioner Jose G. Garcia seeks review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the dismissal of the bigamy charge due to prescription. He argues that bigamy is a public offense, and thus prescription should be counted from the time the State discovered it, not when he personally discovered the prior marriage. He also contends that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the allegations in the information and that the factual bases for the motion to quash were inconclusive. Furthermore, he asserts that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the private respondent's numerous trips abroad. The petition essentially rehashes arguments made in his appeal brief to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the prescriptive period for bigamy commences from the discovery of the crime by the offended party or by the State. Whether a motion to quash can consider facts outside the allegations in the information. Whether the factual bases presented by the private respondent for the motion to quash were conclusive. Whether the private respondent's trips abroad interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.

Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

On the commencement of the prescriptive period: The Court held that bigamy is a public offense, but it is incorrect to state that only the State is the offended party. Article 91 of the RPC provides that the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the "offended party, the authorities, or their agents." The term "offended party" is defined as the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, and in cases where the offender is civilly liable, that party is considered the offended party. In bigamy, both the first and second spouses can be offended parties. The petitioner himself admitted in the information that he was the offended party who suffered damage and prejudice. Therefore, the discovery of the crime by the petitioner (the offended party) in 1974 was the correct starting point for the prescriptive period. On the scope of a motion to quash: The Court reiterated that a motion to quash can be based on factual and legal grounds, and it is not limited to the allegations in the information, especially when the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability due to prescription. The Court cited Section 2 of the old Rule 117 and the current Rule 117, Section 2, which allows for "distinctly" specifying "factual and legal grounds." The Court noted that the prosecution did not object to the presentation of evidence by the private respondent to support her claim of prescription, making it impractical to ignore the evidence of prescription based on "pure technicality." On the conclusiveness of factual bases: The petitioner could not disown his own sworn statements made under oath in a civil case and in his complaint with the CSC. The Court found no vagueness in his statements regarding the discovery of the private respondent's prior marriage in 1974. The petitioner's claim that the term "discovered" referred only to "initial, unconfirmed and uninvestigated raw, hearsay information" was rejected, as the relevant fact was that he was informed of a prior marriage. On the interruption of the prescriptive period: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the private respondent's numerous trips abroad did not constitute the "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" contemplated in Article 91 of the RPC that would interrupt the prescriptive period. These trips were brief, and the private respondent always returned to the Philippines. Even if the aggregate number of days were considered, the information was filed well beyond the 15-year prescriptive period.

Main Doctrine

The prescriptive period for bigamy commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The 'offended party' in bigamy includes the offended spouse, and the discovery can be based on the offended party's own knowledge or information, not solely on the State's acquisition of evidence. Brief trips abroad by the accused do not constitute 'absence from the Philippine Archipelago' that would interrupt the prescriptive period.

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