Kho v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Antonio T. Kho, a losing candidate in the 1995 gubernatorial elections in Masbate, filed an election protest against respondent Emilio A. Espinosa, who was proclaimed the winner. Kho sought to set aside Espinosa's proclamation and be declared the winner. Procedural History: Summons was issued to Espinosa on June 1, 1995, requiring him to answer within five days. Espinosa received the summons on June 6, 1995, but filed his answer with counter-protest only on June 15, 1995. Kho moved to expunge the answer with counter-protest due to its late filing. Kho also filed an omnibus motion praying for a general denial to be entered as Espinosa had not filed an answer within the reglementary period. The COMELEC First Division, however, issued an order on July 26, 1995, admitting Espinosa's answer with counter-protest. Espinosa later filed a compliance specifying counter-protested precincts, which was also admitted by the COMELEC First Division on September 23, 1995, along with an order for cash deposit and collection of ballot boxes. Kho filed a motion to resolve his earlier motion to expunge, which was dismissed by the COMELEC First Division on September 26, 1995, holding that Espinosa's filing was within the period. Kho's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC First Division on November 15, 1995, citing the failure to move for reconsideration of the July 26, 1995 order and the need to prevent delay. Kho then filed a manifestation and motion addressed to the COMELEC en banc, praying for elevation and setting aside of the orders, but this was denied by the COMELEC First Division on February 28, 1996, which deemed the orders interlocutory and not requiring en banc action. The Petition: Kho filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in admitting Espinosa's belated answer with counter-protest and in refusing to elevate the case to the COMELEC en banc. He prayed for a temporary restraining order and for the COMELEC to proceed without considering Espinosa's answer with counter-protest.
Issue(s)
Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting respondent Espinosa's answer with counter-protest filed beyond the reglementary period. Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to elevate the case to the COMELEC en banc.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Order dated July 26, 1995, admitting the answer with counter-protest of the private respondent, as well as other related orders pertaining to the admission of the answer with counter-protest, were declared void for having been issued without jurisdiction. The COMELEC First Division was directed to proceed with the hearing of the protest case without considering the answer with counter-protest of the private respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious, holding that respondent Espinosa filed his answer with counter-protest beyond the mandatory five-day reglementary period. Espinosa received the summons on June 6, 1995, making his deadline for filing the answer June 11, 1995. However, he filed it on June 15, 1995. The Court emphasized that a counter-protest, which is incorporated in the answer, must be filed within the time required for the answer, or within an extended period if a motion for extension was granted. Since Espinosa did not file a motion for extension, the COMELEC First Division had no basis to admit the belatedly filed answer with counter-protest. Citing Arrieta vs. Rodriguez, the Court reiterated that a counter-protest filed outside the period provided by law results in the loss of jurisdiction for the forum to entertain it. Therefore, the COMELEC First Division's order admitting the answer with counter-protest and subsequent implementing orders were void for having been issued without jurisdiction. The Court noted that Kho had consistently assailed the late filing, even without moving for reconsideration of the July 26, 1995 order, thus the jurisdictional infirmity persisted. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC First Division's ruling that the case did not necessitate elevation to the COMELEC en banc. The Court explained that the orders admitting the answer with counter-protest were interlocutory, as they merely addressed an incidental issue and did not finally dispose of the case. Under Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders of a division are resolved by the division itself. Furthermore, the case did not fall under the specific instances enumerated in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure where the Commission must sit en banc. The Court clarified that when a COMELEC division commits grave abuse of discretion in issuing interlocutory orders, and the case does not fit the exceptions for en banc action, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not an elevation to the COMELEC en banc.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court held that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the belatedly filed answer with counter-protest of respondent Espinosa. The Court reiterated that a counter-protest, being an integral part of the answer, must be filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Failure to do so, without a prior motion for extension, renders the counter-protest void and beyond the COMELEC's jurisdictional authority to entertain. Consequently, all subsequent orders admitting the belated counter-protest and its implementing orders were declared void.