Grego v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Wilmer Grego filed a petition for disqualification against Humberto Basco, a candidate for City Councilor in Manila. The basis for the disqualification was a prior Supreme Court decision in 1981 (Adm. Matter No. P-2363) that removed Basco from his position as Deputy Sheriff due to serious misconduct. The Court's ruling dismissed Basco from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and prejudice to reinstatement in any government position. Despite this, Basco was elected as Councilor in 1988, 1992, and again in 1995. Procedural History: Petitioner Grego filed a petition for disqualification against Basco on May 13, 1995, alleging Basco was ineligible due to the 1981 administrative case. The COMELEC's First Division dismissed the petition on October 6, 1995, ruling that Basco's subsequent elections by the electorate condoned the prior administrative penalty and that his proclamation rendered the petition moot. Grego's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc on July 31, 1996. This denial led to the current petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner Grego seeks certiorari and prohibition, arguing that Basco should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code), which disqualifies those removed from office due to an administrative case. Grego contends this provision should apply retroactively to Basco's 1981 dismissal. He also argues that Basco's elections do not condone the penalty, that Basco's proclamation while the disqualification case was pending is void ab initio, and that the seventh-place candidate should be declared the winner. The petition raises four specific issues for the Court's resolution regarding the retroactivity of the law, the effect of elections on disqualification, the validity of proclamation, and the declaration of a winning candidate.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 40(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before its effectivity on January 1, 1992. Whether private respondent's election in 1988, 1992, and 1995 as City Councilor of Manila wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against him, thereby restoring his eligibility for public office. Whether private respondent's proclamation as the sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by the COMELEC, is void ab initio. Whether Romualdo S. Maranan, who placed seventh among the candidates for City Councilor of Manila, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July 31, 1996, is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the retroactivity of Section 40(b) of R.A. 7160: The Court held that Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) is not applicable retroactively. The principle that statutes operate prospectively and not retroactively, unless expressly declared or clearly implied, was invoked. The Court cited settled jurisprudence, including Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, Reyes v. COMELEC, and Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., which established that laws are not to be construed as having retroactive effect unless such intent is clearly indicated. The language of Section 40(b), while using the past tense, does not necessitate retroactive application, as the general rule of prospective application of laws (lex prospicit, non respicit) prevails. Therefore, Basco's dismissal in 1981, prior to the LGC's effectivity on January 1, 1992, does not fall under this disqualification. On the condonation of the administrative penalty by the electorate: The Court found this issue to be beside the point because Basco was not disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC at the time of his elections. The argument that the electorate's vote can erase disqualification, as discussed in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, is only relevant if a disqualification actually exists. Since the LGC provision was not applicable to Basco's prior dismissal, his eligibility was not affected by this provision, rendering the question of condonation moot. On the validity of the proclamation made during the pendency of the disqualification case: The Court ruled that the proclamation was not void ab initio. Section 20(i) of R.A. 7166, cited by the petitioner, pertains to void proclamations due to contested election returns, not contested qualifications. Section 6 of R.A. 6646, which allows for the suspension of proclamation when evidence of guilt is strong, uses the word "may," indicating discretion on the part of the COMELEC, not a mandatory duty to suspend. The COMELEC's Rules of Procedure, Section 5, Rule 25, which mandates suspension, was deemed an implementing rule that could not override the law's permissive language. The Court emphasized that the Board of Canvassers has a ministerial duty to proclaim the apparent winner based on election returns absent any irregularity or injunction. The cases cited by petitioner (Duremdes, Benito, Aguam) were found to be inapplicable to the factual circumstances of this case. On the declaration of a seventh-placer as a winning candidate: The Court stated that Romualdo S. Maranan could not be declared a winner. Firstly, Basco was a qualified candidate. Secondly, Basco received the winning number of votes. The exception discussed in Labo v. COMELEC, where a second placer might be declared winner if the highest vote-getter is disqualified and the electorate is aware of the disqualification, was deemed inapplicable because Basco was not disqualified, and the alleged notoriety of his disqualification was speculative and unsupported by evidence.
Main Doctrine
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), which disqualifies persons removed from office as a result of an administrative case, is not retroactive and applies only to removals occurring on or after January 1, 1992. Furthermore, the prohibition against 'reinstatement' in an administrative penalty refers specifically to appointive positions and does not bar a person from running for an elective office.