Lim v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 129040 · 1997-11-17 · J. MENDOZA, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Political
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Nestor C. Lim and private respondent Salvador O. Sanchez were candidates for mayor of Uson, Masbate in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lim was proclaimed winner. On May 22, 1995, Sanchez filed an election protest alleging fraud. Lim was served summons on June 2, 1995. On June 15, 1995, Lim's counsel entered appearance and moved for an extension to file an answer. The trial court granted a ten-day extension until June 26, 1995. Instead, on June 22, 1995, Lim filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the protest was filed out of time. The trial court denied this motion on August 23, 1995, holding the protest was timely filed as May 21, 1995, the last day, fell on a Sunday. Lim's motion for reconsideration was denied. He questioned this in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. Lim also filed a motion for a bill of particulars, which was denied on November 8, 1995. On November 13, 1995, Lim filed his answer with counterprotest. Procedural History: The revision of ballots for Sanchez's protest was completed on June 10, 1996. Lim moved for the revision of ballots for his counterprotest on June 13, 1996. The trial court denied this motion on August 7, 1996, stating the answer with counterprotest was filed out of time. Lim's motion for reconsideration was denied on September 9, 1996. He filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, which dismissed it on April 17, 1997. Lim received the resolution on the same day and filed a motion for reconsideration, which he later withdrew, filing the present petition on May 17, 1997. Meanwhile, on May 8, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision annulling Lim's proclamation and declaring Sanchez the winner. The Petition: Petitioner Lim contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's order denying his counterprotest. He argues that the Rules of Court, not the COMELEC Rules, govern pleadings in election contests cognizable by Regional Trial Courts and that his pleadings were filed within the periods prescribed by the Rules of Court.

Issue(s)

Whether the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the trial court's denial of petitioner's counterprotest; and whether the Rules of Court, as opposed to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the Omnibus Election Code, govern the periods for filing pleadings in election contests cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. Whether the private respondent's election protest was timely filed. Whether petitioner's answer with counterprotest was filed within the reglementary period.

Ruling

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The COMELEC correctly found that petitioner's counterprotest was filed out of time. The reglementary periods for filing pleadings in election contests involving municipal offices are governed by the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, not the Rules of Court. Petitioner's answer with counterprotest was filed significantly beyond the prescribed five-day period, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain it.

Ratio Decidendi

On the governing rules for pleading periods in election contests and grave abuse of discretion: The Court clarified that for election contests involving municipal and barangay offices, the procedure is governed by specific provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. No. 881, Art. XXI, §254) and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 35). These rules provide a simple, inexpensive, and expeditious procedure distinct from the Rules of Court. The petitioner's contention that the Rules of Court should apply because the case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is without merit, as the COMELEC is empowered to prescribe rules for election contests regardless of the court level. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Rule 35, merely reproduced the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code concerning election contests before trial courts. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. On the timeliness of the election protest: The Court affirmed the COMELEC's finding that the private respondent's election protest was filed on time. The protest was sent by registered mail on May 22, 1995. Considering that the last day of the ten-day reglementary period, May 21, 1995, fell on a Sunday, the filing on May 22, 1995, was considered timely. This ruling addressed the initial procedural step taken by the private respondent. On the timeliness of the counterprotest: The Court found that the petitioner's counterprotest was filed out of time. Petitioner received summons and copies of the election protest on June 2, 1995. Under the Omnibus Election Code (§254(b)) and COMELEC Rules (§7(a)), the protestee (petitioner) should have filed an answer within five days from receipt of the summons, which would be on or before June 7, 1995. A counter-protest must be filed within the same period fixed for the answer (§254(c) and §7(b)). Petitioner's motion for extension was filed on June 15, 1995, eight days after the deadline, and was therefore late. His answer with counterprotest was filed on November 13, 1995, over five months late. The Court reiterated the principle that a counterprotest is equivalent to a counterclaim and must be presented as part of the answer within the reglementary period. Failure to do so results in the court acquiring no jurisdiction to entertain it. The Court cited Maliwanag v. Herrera and Kho v. COMELEC in support of this principle.

Main Doctrine

The filing of a counterprotest must strictly adhere to the reglementary periods prescribed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the Omnibus Election Code, as these rules govern election contests involving municipal offices, and failure to comply with these periods results in the loss of jurisdiction to entertain the counterprotest.

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