People v. Fabro
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: During a strike in Olongapo City, Dionisio Joaquin, an organizer, was shot and killed while sleeping with his companion, Anthony Beck, at the veranda of the Whisky Bar. Beck was awakened by the gunshot, saw a man running away, and identified the fleeing man as Nicomedes Fabro (appellant). Police officers went to Fabro's residence but failed to apprehend him. Fabro was surrendered by his sister to the CIS the following day. Procedural History: Fabro, along with co-accused Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala, were charged with murder. Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during the trial. The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, found Fabro, Dimalanta, and Alcala guilty of murder and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The trial court noted the presence of three aggravating circumstances: treachery, evident premeditation, and consideration of reward. Fabro appealed the decision. The Petition: Appellant Nicomedes Fabro appealed his conviction, assailing the trial court's findings on the admissibility of his confession, the identification by the prosecution witness, the existence of conspiracy, and the appreciation of aggravating circumstances.
Issue(s)
Whether the extrajudicial confession of appellant Nicomedes Fabro was admissible in evidence despite his claims of threat and intimidation. Whether the identification of appellant by witness Anthony Beck was sufficient and credible. Whether the prosecution witnesses' testimonies constituted inadmissible hearsay. Whether conspiracy among the accused was sufficiently established. Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and reward were present.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court finding appellant Nicomedes Fabro guilty of murder, with a modification increasing the indemnity to P50,000.00. The Court held that the extrajudicial confession was admissible, the identification by the witness was credible, conspiracy was established, and the aggravating circumstances were properly appreciated. The Court also considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of appellant's confession: The Court held that the confession was admissible. It reiterated that under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent and to counsel, which cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The Court found that appellant was assisted by Atty. Isagani Jungco, the IBP President, who testified that he apprised appellant of his constitutional rights, and appellant waived them in his presence. The Court dismissed appellant's claims of threat and intimidation as uncorroborated and insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity and the testimony of Atty. Jungco. The Court emphasized that the burden of proving involuntariness rests on the accused, and appellant failed to present convincing evidence of force or intimidation. The presence of exculpatory claims and facts only appellant could have known in the confession further bolstered its voluntariness. On the defense of alibi vs. positive identification: The Court found the defense of alibi (or denial, as appellant admitted being at the scene) unconvincing. Witness Anthony Beck positively identified appellant as the person he saw running away from the crime scene and later identified him in court. The Court noted that Beck saw appellant's face during the chase. The Court gave credence to Beck's testimony, which directly contradicted appellant's claim of sleeping and being awakened by shouts, and was consistent with appellant's confession. On alleged hearsay evidence: The Court clarified that while the name of the appellant might have been supplied by another person to witness Beck, Beck's personal identification of the appellant in court, based on seeing his face during the incident, was not hearsay. The Court distinguished between knowing the name and knowing the identity of the person. On the existence of conspiracy: The Court found the existence of conspiracy indubitable, supported by the confessions of both appellant Fabro and co-accused Dimalanta. Fabro's confession detailed how Dimalanta offered him money to kill the victim, how they observed the victim's movements, and how Dimalanta and Alcala were present at the scene as lookouts. Dimalanta's confession corroborated these details, including the payment of money. The Court held that the acts of the accused demonstrated a common purpose and unity in execution, inferring conspiracy from their connected actions towards the same unlawful object. On aggravating circumstances: The Court affirmed the presence of treachery, evident premeditation, and consideration of price or reward. Treachery was established by shooting the victim while asleep, affording no opportunity for defense. Evident premeditation was shown by the planning, hiring of the appellant, and the lapse of time between the planning and the execution, including an unsuccessful prior attempt. The consideration of price was evidenced by the P10,000.00 promised to Dimalanta and the P5,000.00 initial payment shared by the accused. The Court noted that while all three were proven, only one (treachery) qualified the crime to murder, and the others served as generic aggravating circumstances. The Court also considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, offsetting one generic aggravating circumstance, leading to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Main Doctrine
An extrajudicial confession obtained during custodial investigation is admissible in evidence if the accused was informed of his constitutional rights, waived them in writing and in the presence of counsel, and if the defense fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the confession was obtained through force, duress, undue influence, or other forms of involuntariness. The testimony of an independent counsel assisting the accused during the investigation, confirming adherence to constitutional requirements, is given significant weight.